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Nuclear weapons were rapidly incorporated into the
policies for maintaining the national security objectives of
both the Soviet Union and the United States— in spite of
poorly understood nuclear weapons effects.
The nuclear winter hypothesis, the basis of which was
first proposed in 1982, directed scientific research into
the consequences of massive amounts of dust and smoke, from
nuclear detonations, on the earth's climate and subsequently
on the ecology of the earth. This thesis presents the
evolution of the nuclear winter hypothesis in order to
elucidate its unique aspects for global devastation and the
consensus of plausibility which the hypothesis holds in the
scientific community.
The hypothesis has aroused a flurry of debate on its
implications for nuclear policy. With the historical
aspects of the nuclear era as a backdrop, the question of
incorporating new scientific information on the consequences
of nuclear war into policy is discussed.
The observed responses of the U.S. and Soviet Union and
the implications for future actions in response to the
nuclear winter hypothesis are examined—leading to the
conclusion that the hypothesis will have little or no impact
on U.S. and Soviet nuclear policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION; THE NUCLEAR BACKDROP—
U.S. AND SOVIET VIEWS
'Nuclear peace' has been maintained for over 40 years
—
through cold wars, regional conflicts, and acts of
terrorism. The world's nuclear arsenal of over 50,000
warheads has shaped nations' interactions even through its
non-use. The past 40 years tend to suggest a high level of
stability in our nuclear relationships—but it is a
stability that is constantly challenged. Policy makers must
ask the questions of how best to maintain the stability,
what actions should be taken should this stability fail, and
what the consequences of its failure might be.
Technology permitted the development of nuclear weapons
before the technology existed to analyze the effects of
their use. Policy makers must consider these effects if
they are to address the consequences of stability failing in
the formulation of policy. As stated by Dr. Arthur Katz in
Life After Nuclear War . "A realistic understanding of the
effects of nuclear war is needed so that the implicit
assumptions upon which nuclear policy alternatives are based
may be understood." [Ref. l:p. 4] Strategic plans have
clearly responded to advances in weapon technologies.
MIRVing capabilities and increased targeting accuracy have
provided nuclear response options to the early U.S. policy
of massive retaliation.
Advancements in technology have also stimulated the
scientific communities' investigation beyond the immediate
effects of nuclear weapons and their military applications,
into the long-term effects and ecological impact of nuclear
weapons' use. The difficulties of decision making in
response to this area of information reflect not only the
conflicting notions of how best to achieve national security
goals, but also the uncertainties of our present fragmentary
understanding of long-term effects. The nuclear winter
hypothesis 1
, which deals with the atmospheric and climatic
consequences of a nuclear exchange, is the most recent area
of investigation into a previously unappreciated realm of
potential consequences. If strategic decision makers are to
respond and incorporate new information on long term effects
into policy, the responses must be made within the framework
of our existing nuclear strategy and policies for national
security.
A. U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY
This section will provide the nuclear backdrop to the
United States' quest for national security. The concerns
and forces that influenced the evolution of U.S. nuclear
'-The term "nuclear winter" will be used throughout this
thesis for the sake of simplicity. It is noted, however,
that many scientific analyses avoid the term for reasons
similar to the one given in the SCOPE report, ". . . it does
not, in a strict scientific sense, properly portray the
range, complexity, and dependencies of the potential global
scale environmental consequences of a nuclear war." [Ref.
2 :p. xi]
policy will be presented in order to later examine the
nuclear policy issues raised by the new scientific evidence
surrounding the nuclear winter hypothesis.
Soviet reaction to the nuclear winter hypothesis is a
major factor for consideration when discussing possible U.S.
responses in nuclear policy which impact our deterrence
posture. U.S. nuclear policies will be contrasted with
Soviet views, since it is the behavior of the Soviets with
which the United States is most concerned. Casper
Weinberger, in his Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year
1988, states,
Of the threats to our national security that our defense
programs are designed to meet, that posed by the Soviet
Union is by far the most serious and the most immediate.
. . . the largest, and most expensive, part of our defense
effort is driven by the power and policy of the Soviet
Union. [Ref. 3:p. 23]
The basic defense strategy of the United States is the
deterrence of aggression. Since the end of World War II,
this strategy has relied on nuclear weapons to dissuade
our adversaries by the threat of retaliation from ever
using nuclear weapons against the United States, our
allies, or our friends. At the same time, . . . our
defense policy has continued to rely on U.S. nuclear
weapons to help deter conventional attacks, as well. . . .
[Ref. 3:p. 51]
Over the years, the official statements pronounced by
each Administration as our nation's nuclear policy, i.e.,
the declaratory policy, have undergone many modifications to
the basic strategy of nuclear deterrence and have exhibited
conflicting approaches of how best to achieve deterrence.
Aaron Friedberg describes, in a simplified form, the two
major schools of thought on deterrence philosophy which have
affected the modifications to U.S. declaratory policy and
which are contrasted in their influence on the military's
wartime employment plans or operational policy. The nuclear
winter hypothesis has potential for altering the impact of
each school of thought, particularly in their impact on
declaratory policy. The 'assured destructionist ' school
emphasizes the importance of the countervalue deterrent, the
dangers of regarding nuclear forces as ordinary weapons of
war, the risks of threatening the enemy's nuclear
capabilities, the value of stability and the necessity for
indices of 'sufficiency.' [Ref. 4:p. 39] Bernard Brodie's
The Absolute Weapon published in 1946 clearly expressed the
belief that there could be no military or politically
meaningful form of victory in a nuclear war. The basic
premise underlying the doctrine of mutual deterrence states
that modern strategy should be geared to prevent wars (not
to win them) , with an emphasis on sufficiency in strategic
weapons rather than superiority. This school of thought has
had a particularly powerful impact on the United States'
approach to defense, wherein meaningful defenses are
frequently characterized as technically impossible,
psychologically counterproductive, or destabilizing. [Ref.
5: p. 25] For example, the current debate over the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) contains elements of this thinking
in the arguments against SDI. Many of these arguments are
similar to those made in opposition to implementation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems in the late 1960s.
These analogous arguments include: 1) technical infeasibil-
ity; 2) destabilization (may prompt a pre-emptive attack or
fuel an action-reaction arms race); and, 3) unacceptable
expense for implementation.
The other school of thought displays a more traditional
military approach to war. It focuses on war outcomes, on
the importance of preparing to achieve objectives of war
(should deterrence fail) , and on the necessity for defeating
the enemy by denying him his objectives and destroying his
willingness and ability to wage war. The operational war
plans of the United States have reportedly been guided by
this school of thought with consistency. [Ref. 4:pp. 37-71]
Since 1945, U.S. declaratory policy has at times been
dominated by one or the other of these approaches. Their
coexistence has created situations characterized by a
mismatch of declaratory and operational policy, and of a
mismatch of declaratory policy and capabilities.
A brief summary of U.S. nuclear policy is provided in
order to characterize the dominant concerns and forces.
Following World War II, the reliance on nuclear weapons was
greatly influenced by the economics of defense. Nuclear
weapons are more cost effective than larger conventional
10
forces. Cost continues to be the primary factor holding
back the build-up of NATO's conventional forces.
The U.S. nuclear arsenal was extremely small during the
first five years of the nuclear era, and there were no
Soviet nuclear weapons until 1949. As both Soviet and U.S.
arsenals began to expand, more targeting alternatives were
added to the war plans. The policy of Massive Retaliation,
developed early in the Eisenhower administration, promoted
Soviet containment via superior nuclear military forces
sustained by a strong national economy. The U.S. was
prepared to mount a massive strike on the Soviet Union with
impunity.
In 1960 a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS)
was formed to facilitate inter-service cooperation, to draw
up a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and to prepare a
Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) . An optimum mix
of high priority military, industrial and government control
targets was designated. [Ref. 4:p. 42] Since this time,
the operational plans which allocate a significant portion
of U.S. strategic forces to military targets have been
remarkably consistent. Declaratory policy, however, went
through significant changes in the 1960s.
As the size and destructive capabilities of Soviet
forces continued to grow and the U.S. was perceived as being
more vulnerable, a reevaluation of U.S. declaratory policy
took place. Slowly the emphasis shifted from deterrence
11
through strategic superiority and from threats of first use
to an emphasis on deterrence and stability through a secure
second-strike capability and flexible options of
retaliation.
In the mid 1960s Secretary of Defense McNamara proposed
the concept of Assured Destruction and Damage Limitation.
Assured Destruction, which was similar to massive
retaliation, was defined as the ability to inflict an
unacceptable degree of damage on an aggressor even after
absorbing a surprise first attack. The "unacceptable
degree" of damage was arrived at through a systems analysis
approach which determined a finite amount of force required
to inflict the damage— i.e., 400 equivalent megatonnage
(EMT) . Thus, this approach allows for budgetary limits to
be set on strategic procurements on the basis of cost-
effectiveness criteria.
The concept of Damage Limitation incorporated a
warfighting posture involving counterforce targeting
requiring offensive and defense capabilities. Damage
Limitation advocacy was short-lived, as the emphasis passed
to Assured Destruction alone. In part, Damage Limitation
fell from favor due to budgetary considerations—it did not
offer the convenient finite aspect of weapons procurement.
It was also criticized as increasing defense expenditures
without any real gain in security (stressing the approach
12
that there is no effective defense from nuclear war) , and as
promoting a destabilizing strategy of first strike.
The adoption of Assured Destruction as the declaratory
policy by 1968 did not affect the operational targeting
plans. It did, however, have a significant impact on U.S.
strategic force capabilities which would continue to raise
concern over the inability to carry out an operational plan
dependent on forces based on a different declaratory policy.
The Assured Destruction concept places almost total emphasis
on deterrence vice nuclear warfighting.
President Nixon's sufficiency doctrine was based on a
belief that previous U.S. superiority was no longer
attainable or meaningful. Sufficiency was equated with an
adequate second-strike force. As the Soviets* force
capabilities increased and parity was acknowledged, Assured
Destruction became termed Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
by the West. Arms control took on increasing importance in
the West as a means of achieving strategic stability.
Although Mutual Assured Destruction was never an official
policy of the U.S., it was the basis for the negotiating
approach of the U.S. to the SALT I and ABM talks. The
Western objectives in SALT were to place limits on strategic
offensive arms but to still permit each side to maintain a
nuclear arsenal capable of inflicting unacceptable damage.
The ABM Treaty limited the ability of each side to reduce
the expected level of damage resulting from the adversary's
13
nuclear retaliatory response. This approach was supposed to
create strategic stability where neither side has an
incentive to strike first. "The MAD and its SALT I
companion seemed to mark the end of U.S. postwar attempts to
maintain superiority in strategic weapons." [Ref. 6:p. 155]
A major flaw in the MAD concept was its unilateral
acceptance by the West. In spite of hopeful attempts at
"educating" the Soviets in Western deterrence theory, it
eventually became apparent that their strategy and
objectives were in fact different than that of the U.S. The
Soviets have continued with their steady investment in
counterforce capable offensive forces, and in air, civil and
ballistic missile defenses undermining the credibility of an
Assured Destruction policy. [Ref. 7: p. 23]
The early 1970s saw a revived interest in Damage
Limitation and counterforce targeting (with a survivable
assured destruction capability held in reserve) . This
change was brought about by the influences of improved
technology (limited nuclear options were now more feasible)
,
the changing nuclear balance, a greater appreciation for
Soviet views on nuclear war, and appreciation for deterrent
credibility as perceived by the adversary. The new
strategic doctrine proposed by Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger and promulgated in 1974 as National Security
Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 rejected the MAD philosophy.
The new doctrine retained the theme of maintaining an
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adequate second-strike force but added an emphasis on
planning to use nuclear weapons much more selectively than
had been planned in the past. Limited nuclear options
(LNOs) made possible by advanced technology, provided
flexible hard and soft targeting options which would
minimize collateral damage. This new doctrine also made
possible consideration of a protracted nuclear war
—
selective use with minimized damage indicated that a nuclear
exchange could occur over a long period of time. These
characteristics of NSDM-242 have continued to be a part of
U.S. declaratory policy since 1974.
President Carter endorsed the Countervailing Strategy in
1980. The Countervailing Strategy of Presidential Directive
(PD) 59 stressed the ability to retaliate at any level of
conflict so as to deny the enemy's objectives. The Reagan
Administration's Force Modernization Program stresses the
implementation of this strategy through revitalization of
strategic offensive and defensive forces.
The more traditional military approach to war has
reappeared in the present U.S. declaratory policy and has
shaped the operational plans since the 1960s. In the aspect
of counterforce targeting as a warfighting strategy, the
U.S. declaratory nuclear policy has become more similar to
that of the Soviet Union. However, the present U.S.
declaratory policy continues to be a matter of intense
debate. The nuclear winter hypothesis may intensify this
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debate, by challenging the present policy of nuclear
weapons' use. The notions of assured destruction—that
counterforce targeting and defensive systems are inherently
dangerous, and that nuclear weapons cannot have military and
political utility—are deeply entrenched in the American
public's view of nuclear war.
B. THE SOVIET VIEW OF NUCLEAR WAR
The changes imparted to the U.S. declaratory policy in
the 1970s were due, in part, to an appreciation and
recognition for Soviet doctrine. If the U.S. hopes to
correctly anticipate (and possibly counter) the Soviet
Union's response to the nuclear winter hypothesis, this
appreciation must continue. Although the question of Soviet
motives and objectives has many answers dependent on the
analyst's particular paradigm, there are, as Casper
Weinberger notes in his Report to the Congress, facts of
Soviet policy and military capability to which the U.S. must
respond. The Soviet Union has displayed consistent efforts
and success in building an enormous military capability.
[Ref. 3:p. 23]
An investigation into the available Soviet writings can
help to illuminate the policies of the Soviet Union. A
successful American nuclear strategy must be capable of
influencing Soviet behavior. Attempts to understand their
behavior can be made through an analysis of their actions
and available literature. Interpretation of Soviet strategy
16
is not without its difficulties. The Soviet Union's
emphasis on maintaining strict secrecy from its own people
and from the outside world concerning all aspects of events
and policies provides a stark contrast to the freedom of
information available in the U.S. In the Soviet Union,
secrecy is also combined with organized deception as a
national policy to promote and enhance their objectives.
As mentioned above, a significant point in the evolution
of U.S. strategy was the recognition of the existence of a
uniquely Soviet doctrine. Marxist-Leninist ideology
provides the major guidelines for Soviet doctrine. To
briefly summarize, exploitation by Imperialists is the cause
of the problems in developing countries. Resistance to
imperialism in the underdeveloped countries, aided as
possible by the Soviet Union, will continue to grow. This
resistance combined with the inherent contradictions of
capitalism will eventually cause its demise. As the end
nears for capitalism, the capitalists will initiate a
violent struggle to maintain power. Soviet belief in the
dialectic nature of history assures them of the eventual
triumph of socialism.
A major doctrinal reorientation of the Leninist tenet of
inevitable war was expressed by Khrushchev in 1956 at the
2 0th Party Congress. He asserted that the global balance of
power was changing in favor of socialism, and as a result,
the "peace forces" might be capable of preventing the West
17
from "unleashing war." Although war was no longer
considered fatally inevitable, the struggle between
socialism and capitalism would continue. [Ref. 8:pp. 83,84]
However, the possibility of nuclear war cannot be ruled out
—especially as a possible desperate non-rational attempt by
imperialism in its death throes.
A nuclear weapons policy has been incorporated into the
ideology of Marx and Lenin. Although nuclear weapons have
changed the character of any future war, the Soviets believe
nuclear weapons have not altered the political essence of
war. Nuclear weapons can provide the critical means of
winning the war should a conventional only option prove
ineffective. Soviet nuclear strikes would be decisive, but
would also require the follow-up of combined arms offensives
for the successful prosecution of a protracted war. A
nuclear war would require the employment of all arms,
conventional and nuclear, to attain final victory.
Soviet doctrine portrays a survivable nuclear war with
an attainable and meaningful victory. They have rejected
the "absolute weapon" notion so common in the United States.
The capability to wage a nuclear war in terms of military
preparation (offensive and active and passive defenses) is a
major element of a visible Soviet deterrent, but it does not
indicate an inclination toward regarding nuclear war as a
rational instrument of policy. Rather, such deterrent
policies are designed to minimize the incentive for
18
attacking the Soviet Union. This is how John Erickson
describes the Soviet concept of deterrence by denial-
designed to prevent the United States from the initiation of
hostilities, to minimize the incentives for attacking the
USSR by guaranteeing counterstrike, and to assure the
survival of the Soviet system. Thus, the Soviet goal of
war-prevention is contrasted with the U.S. attitude of war-
avoidance and the ' unthinkability ' of war. [Ref. 9:pp. 245-
249]
For the Soviets, deterrence stresses both offensive and
defensive goals. The Soviets have a massive program of both
active and passive defense. Casper Weinberger describes the
Soviet deterrent as "not simply to deter any attack against
themselves, but to erode the deterrent character of U.S.
nuclear forces." [Ref. 3:p. 24] There does not appear to
be a distinction in Soviet doctrine between deterrence and
the capability to fight a war [Ref. 10:p. 210].
The position that war would be suicidal for both parties
has been espoused by Soviet leaders but can be interpreted
as an export philosophy. Inside the Soviet Union, such talk
is generally denounced as "bourgeois pacifism." [Ref. 11 :p.
30] The Soviets openly used the theme of a winnable nuclear
war in their literature for many years until they recognized
a changed perception by the West in the 1970s. Since then,
public statements are intended to give the perception that
they believe a nuclear war is not "winnable" but statements
19
still include comments that a nuclear war would be concluded
on terms favorable to the Soviets. [Ref. 10 :p. 216]
Although there is no way for the West to ascertain what
would constitute unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union,
Soviet writings indicate that they expect to suffer large
numbers of casualties in the event of a nuclear war.
Richard Pipes quotes General Bochkarev:
The fundamental line of our Party is expressed with utmost
precision and clarity: if imperialism commits a crime and
plunges mankind into the abyss of nuclear war, imperialism
will perish, and not "both sides," not socialism, although
the socialist countries, too, will face supreme tests and
suffer immense losses. [Ref. 12: pp. 56,57]
This idea of victory, even under the recognized devastation
of an undesired World War III, encompasses expectations that
the United States tends to deem incompatible with a
meaningful concept of victory. The Soviet's criteria for
victory includes regime maintenance, recovery and
reconstruction, and the destruction of the U.S. war-waging
potential . [Ref. 8:p. 137]
The Soviet Union has declared a "no first use" policy.
A closer examination of military writings reveals
significant subtleties of this declaration. If the Soviet
Union determined that an attack was imminent, it would not
hesitate to launch a preemptive first strike. Soviet
strategists stress the importance of surprise and the need
to be prepared at all times to disrupt a surprise attack by
the aggressors. "By going first, and especially disrupting
command and control, the highest likelihood of limiting
20
damage and coming out of the war with intact forces and a
surviving nation is achieved, virtually independent of the
force balance." [Ref. 13 :p. 164]
The Soviets do not desire a war, especially if their
objectives can be achieved through other means. They fully
recognize the persuasiveness of military might in foreign
interactions. As Brezhnev reportedly predicted (looking to
1985) in his 1973 Prague speech, "we will be in a position
to impose our will with impunity, not only in Western Europe
but in other areas of interest."
—
giving the reasons for
this as deployment of a new generation of strategic weapons
and the successful Soviet influence in the Third World. The
value of superiority in quantitative and qualitative
military forces, designed to fight and win a war, not only
provides the best deterrence, but it also influences daily
international politics. The Soviets believe that the nation
with the most credible doctrine will determine the direction
of international politics. [Ref. 14:pp. 127,128]
Conflict and contradictions in policy have not been
evident in Soviet war planning as they have been in the
West. What is known of Soviet nuclear strategy has remained
essentially unchanged in the nuclear era. The targeting
priorities are: 1) nuclear delivery systems; 2) military
installations; 3) military industries; and, 4) centers of
political-military administration, command and control [Ref.
15:pp. 138,139]. The Soviet literature does not support
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targeting cities or leaving Soviet cities open to a Western
assured second-strike. Active defense of the homeland is a
strong theme. [Ref. 10: p. 212]
The Soviet Union is consistent in its stable, long-term
view of its security problems. Weapons acquisition is
guided by party policy designed to satisfy the requirements
of military doctrine and strategy. The Soviet Union has
persisted in a sustained drive to acquire balanced offensive
and defensive forces. There appears to be a good match
between declaratory strategy and force capability. They
have not experienced the inconsistent allocation of defense
resources characteristic of the West.
For the Soviet Union, deterrence is one-sided; they must
make war unprofitable for the West. "... deterrence is
stable only when USSR nuclear and non-nuclear forces are
superior—not when they are equal to those of the West."
[Ref. 15: pp. 23,24] This deterrent philosophy allows no
room for the concept of mutual vulnerability. Soviet
political attitudes perceive the Western concept of
strategic stability as a reliance on the rationality of the
adversary. Such a mutuality would imply dependence on the
adversary for Soviet security and is an unacceptable
approach for a nation which emphasizes security through
superior force. [Ref. 9: p. 243] Richard Pipes offers an
additional reason why a large military force is essential to
the Soviet Union; "... military power serves not only (or
22
even primarily) to deter external aggression, but also and
above all to ensure internal stability and permit external
expansion." [Ref. 5:p. 29]
C. SUMMARY
The U.S. and Soviet nuclear policies of the past 40
years have each shown characteristic features, indicating
some degree of consistency in the factors guiding the
decision making process of each country. In order to
investigate how the U.S. and the Soviet Union might respond
to the new scientific research surrounding the nuclear
winter hypothesis, the past and present policies were
presented above in terms of the deterrent role of nuclear
weapons in maintaining national security.
In summary, nuclear weapons have been central to the
U.S. deterrence philosophy since 1945. Deterrence
philosophy in the United States consists of two major
schools of thought— 'assured destructionist ' and the
traditional military approach to war. The traditional
military approach has been the dominant influence on the
operational war plans of the United States. Declaratory
policy has evolved from an emphasis on assured destruction
to a policy of selective targeting options and a secure
second-strike force with assured destruction as a last
resort.
It is noted that the assured destructionist ' s view of
war—no meaningful victory in a nuclear war; nuclear weapons
23
provide mutual deterrence— is a common view held by the
American public. Mutual assured destruction philosophy,
although not an official policy, was the basis for the U.S.
negotiating approach to the SALT I talks, illustrating a
lack of appreciation for Soviet doctrine at that time. The
coexistence of these two conflicting philosophies in the
United States has created situations characterized by a
mismatch of declaratory and operational policy, and of a
mismatch of declaratory policy and capabilities.
Soviet nuclear doctrine has exhibited a consistency in
objectives which has guided the steady increase in Soviet
military capability. Soviet doctrine portrays nuclear war
as survivable with a meaningful victory attainable, in spite
of the recognized devastation which is possible. War is not
inevitable, but an irrational act by the West may cause
deterrence to fail. A massive, counterforce, preemptive
first-strike would be launched by the Soviets if they
determined that a strategic nuclear attack by the West was
imminent.
The capability to wage a nuclear war in terms of
military preparation (with nuclear weapons providing the
critical means of winning a war) , is a major element of the
Soviet deterrent. Both offensive and defensive goals are
stressed by the Soviets. Mutual vulnerability is not a part
of Soviet doctrine. Deterrence is considered stable only
when Soviet nuclear and non-nuclear forces are superior.
24
The value of superiority in military forces not only
provides the best deterrence, but also influences daily
international politics in favor of Soviet objectives.
With the above setting of nuclear policies in mind, the
question of incorporating new information on the
consequences of nuclear war into policy will be examined.
Chapter II will describe the fragmentary nature of our
knowledge of nuclear weapons 1 effects—with the newest
scientific investigations directed at the nuclear winter
hypothesis. The evolution of this hypothesis will be
presented to emphasize the validity of the concern over
possible long term climatic disturbances and the consensus
of plausibility for the hypothesis which has developed
within the scientific community. The possible global nature
of the effects and the wide-ranging biological implications
for ecological disaster will be presented as the basis for
the several unique aspects of the hypothesis which have
stimulated debate over nuclear policy issues.
Chapter III will present the primary policy issues
generated in the West by the hypothesis under the broad
categories of: 1) Deterrence (enhanced or questioned?) ; 2)
Relations with allied and nonaligned countries; 3) Nuclear
arsenals; 4) War fighting capabilities, targeting and
strategies; 5) Crisis management and control efforts; and,
6) Civil defense. These issues will be presented in light
of the nuclear backdrop presented in this chapter.
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The observed responses of the United States and the
Soviet Union to the nuclear winter hypothesis will be
examined in the fourth chapter. The U.S. response, in terms
of Congressional hearings, studies sponsored by government
agencies, Department of Defense (DOD) statements, and
allotted funding for continued research, provides indicators
of future actions.
The Soviet beliefs and intentions surrounding actions in
response to the nuclear winter hypothesis will remain a
matter of interpretation and speculation. Chapter IV will
discuss the exploitation potential of the nuclear winter
issue.
The final chapter will provide speculation as to future
response actions of the United States and the Soviet Union
to a hypothesis which has acknowledged plausibility for
previously unappreciated long-term devastation to the
earth's ecological balance— if a nuclear war occurs. This
speculation will be based on an appreciation for the nuclear
policies by which each country has managed to avoid a
nuclear war thus far.
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR WINTER HYPOTHESIS
Nuclear weapons are essential to the deterrence
philosophy of maintaining national security for the Soviet
Union and for the United States. It might at first be
assumed that considerations for the use of such an important
device and its effects would be fully understood. This,
however, was not the case when atomic weapons were first
used against Japan in 1945. Knowledge of nuclear weapons'
effects remains fragmentary with many uncertainties in spite
of the importance placed on them for defense and in spite of
the large world nuclear arsenal.
Much of the advancement in knowledge of nuclear weapons
'
effects was accomplished via accidental discoveries, always
impressing and occasionally surprising nuclear scientists
and engineers. The short-term effects were first studied
following the 1945 detonations. A fair amount of knowledge
on the blast and heat effects is now available giving rise
to many estimates of the number of immediate fatalities from
a nuclear war.
The 1954 Bikini Atoll tests brought recognition of the
danger of distant radioactive contamination. Many
uncertainties remain concerning radioactive contamination
—
for example, tests are still ongoing to determine ways to
minimize the amount of active cesium in the food chains at
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Bikini Atoll so that the displaced Marshallese can safely
return. The incidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
highlight the widespread concern for uncertainties which
still exist. Other previously unappreciated revelations of
nuclear weapons' use have included the Van Allen belt
effects, the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and its effects on
electronic communications, and the effect of injection of
nitrogen oxides into the ozone layer.
With the growth of the arsenals, scientists became
concerned that global environmental effects might occur if a
nuclear war were to occur. Such concern led to projects
like Gabriel and Sunshine— from 1949 through 1959—to
evaluate the danger of radioactive fallout. A 1965 study
undertook a broad analysis of the environmental and
biological consequences of nuclear war, including the
effects of blast, fires, and fallout. These early studies
were hampered by a lack of critical data and inadequate
technical means to analyze vast amounts of data. [Ref.
16:p. 185]
More recently, two of the major studies on nuclear
weapons' effects produced are: 1) The 1975 National Academy
of Science report on Long Term World-Wide Effects of
Multiple-Weapons Detonations , which centered on the recently
identified ozone depletion problem; and, 2) The 1979 U.S.
Office of Technology Assessment study, The Effects of
Nuclear War . which focused mainly on the immediate
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consequences with long term effects centered on cancer and
genetic diseases.
Scientific research began to look comprehensively at the
potential long term climatic and environmental damage of a
nuclear conflict in the 1980s. A new variable was
introduced into the study of nuclear war effects through a
series of related investigations—the variable of
particulates, massive amounts of smoke and dust injected
into the atmosphere as a result of nuclear detonations.
In 1980, scientists investigating the mass extinction of
the late Cretacious period (65 million years ago) , used
geologic evidence to support their proposal that a huge
cloud of dust caused by a meteor impact could have led to
the extinctions. Scientists considered that dust raised as
a result of nuclear explosions may be analogous to dust from
such a meteor impact.
During this same period, Carl Sagan and his colleagues
were working with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) interpreting data from Martian dust
storms being sent back to Earth from Voyager 9. It was
realized that the analytic tools used for studying Martian
dust storms were applicable to the analysis of smoke and
dust on Earth.
Although the destructive potential of fires had been
realized during World War II in Hamburg, Dresden and
Hiroshima, the smoke from such fires had never been
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considered as a factor which could bring about serious, long
term, after-effects of a nuclear war. The main study which
introduced the idea of potentially severe climatic
consequences from large sooty smoke inputs was by P.J.
Crutzen and J.W. Birks, entitled "The Atmosphere After a
Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon," which appeared in Ambio, an
international journal of the human environment published by
the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Crutzen and Birks
calculated that several million tons of thick smoke would
rise from all the fires started by a nuclear exchange. They
estimated that the smoke would cloud the atmosphere of the
northern half of the Earth and block sunlight from its
surface for several weeks. [Ref. 17:pp. 114-125]
The Crutzen and Birks study led to increased interest
and further quantitative investigation. The particular
studies chosen for review in this chapter provide a summary
of the research over the past five years with consideration
given to the most significant work that has been conducted.
Investigations have become more sophisticated and complex
over the years. The atmospheric computer modeling used for
such studies has passed from relatively simple one-
dimensional, radiative-convective models, through three-
dimensional global models with fixed uniform smoke
distributions, to fully interactive models, in which smoke
is injected and allowed to be dispersed by and interact with
atmospheric circulation, and to models which allow the
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infinite heat capacity of the oceans to affect the
atmosphere. The conclusions presented below are
representative of the scientific consensus to date.
The atmospheric models used to investigate the
environmental effects of nuclear winter share common
assumptions. These assumptions include:
1. Nuclear war occurs in the Northern Hemisphere.
2. Nuclear explosions create and loft dust particles and
cause fires that would release considerable quantities
of smoke. Smoke from massive fires (started most
effectively by low-yield air bursts 2 ) would be
injected primarily into the troposphere 3 . Washout of
particles can occur due to rain in the troposphere.
(Scavenging is the term used to include the processes
of washout of particles and of coagulation of
particles.) Dust from ground bursts which vaporize,
melt and pulverize the earth's surface at the target
area, would be propelled into the upper troposphere
and stratosphere. Dust in the stratosphere falls out
much more slowly.
3. The addition of the particulates (dust particles and
smoke) in the atmosphere will decrease the
transmission of solar energy to the earth's surface,
caused by the backscattering effect of dust particles
and smoke's high absorptive properties for solar
radiation. [Ref. 19:pp. 10,11]
2The blast effect from an air burst will affect a
larger area than a ground burst, thus increasing the
potential to start fires over a larger area. [Ref. 18: p. 9]
3The troposphere is the lower region of the earth's
atmosphere (up to approximately 13 km.), wherein most
weather phenomena such as turbulence, precipitation, etc. ,
occur. Above it is the stratosphere, characterized by a





prepared by research scientist
Richard Turco, astronomer Carl Sagan, and three atmospheric
scientists from NASA's Ames Research Center in California,
used computer models to investigate the impact of dust and
smoke in the atmosphere. The term 'Nuclear Winter* was
coined by Richard Turco to express the general predictions
by such computer models of darkened skies and reduced
surface temperatures (especially in summer) brought about by
the smoke and dust injected into the atmosphere from nuclear
detonations. The earth's surface would cool as a
consequence of the smoke in the upper atmosphere absorbing
solar radiation. The burning of cities, due to their
greater concentration of fuel and combustibles, is of
greatest concern in the production of massive amounts of
smoke. [Ref. 20:pp. 1283-1292]
The TTAPS study used a one-dimensional atmospheric
model. Such a model departs from reality in that the
variation of atmospheric properties and processes are
treated only in the vertical direction, there is no
latitudinal or longitudinal variation in geography (the
underlying surface of the earth is taken to be a uniform
land surface) or in any of the atmospheric quantities.
Assumptions were made as to the type of war scenario and the
4The acronym is formed from the first letter of the
last name of the scientists who prepared the report: Turco,
Toon, Ackerman, Pollack and Sagan.
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resultant amount of smoke from fires. The model was used to
portray the injection of the smoke into the atmosphere, the
removal process, and the resultant temperature changes at
the earth's surface.
Several different war scenarios were investigated,
covering a wide range of possible wars. The scenarios
ranged from limited to large-scale attacks (involving 75
percent of the world strategic arsenal) and they included
counterforce and countervalue strikes. Many computer runs
were made on each scenario to investigate the range of
uncertainty on each of the key parameters (e.g., the amount
of smoke injected into the atmosphere) . The baseline war
scenario consisted of a 5000 megaton (Mt) exchange of which
20 percent of the yield hit urban or industrial targets.
The results indicated that extremes of temperature drops
to minus 30°-40°C could be reached in a few weeks after an
exchange. The baseline scenario results indicated that a
temperature minimum of -23°C is reached within a few weeks,
and temperatures return to the freezing point after about
three months. Recovery to normal temperatures was estimated
to take more than a year because of the slow fallout of the
stratospheric dust. [Ref. 18:p. 18]
Although many of the later popular accounts of this new
theory failed to properly emphasize the uncertainties, the
TTAPS authors recognized and fully admitted the
uncertainties and weaknesses of their study. They presented
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the limitations of their study, due to the limitations of
the model used and assumptions made, indicating that some
uncertainties would tend to work toward more severe effects
and others would tend to ameliorate the effects. One of the
limitations of the model was the inability to address the
transport of the particulates in three dimensions. Smoke
and dust were assumed to be uniformly distributed over the
Northern Hemisphere at the start of the calculations. The
one-dimensional study speculated that the smoke and dust
would be transported away from the northern midlatitudes to
involve the equatorial zone and the Southern Hemisphere.
The smoke-transport problem also leaves unaddressed the
possible ameliorating effects of clear patches where the
smoke does not occur. The effects of the ocean (which in
reality contain a large supply of heat) were not addressed
nor was the local atmospheric circulation near coastlines
and implications for rainout. It was speculated that a
drastically altered structure of the atmosphere may change
the lower troposphere into a more stable area, such as
occurs in the present stratosphere, which would then hinder
the conditions that might otherwise cause the rainout of
particles. [Ref. 18:pp. 20-24]
Carl Sagan expanded upon the initial quantitative data
of the TTAPS study to pose additional disconcerting ideas.
These concepts included: 1) the possibility of the
extinction of the human race; 2) a suicidal first-strike
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which is adequate to set off a nuclear winter; and 3) a
threshold can be stated, above which nuclear wars would
cause the onset of the nuclear winter conditions (placed at
between 500-2000 warheads) . [Ref . 21:pp. 35-49]
B. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT
In 1983, the Department of Defense sponsored additional
research conducted by the National Research Council (NRC)
.
The study was overseen by the National Academy of Sciences,
the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine. The report, published in 1985, was given the most
extensive and critical review ever accorded an Academy
study. The value of this study comes from its clear
presentation of the nature and extent of uncertainties
surrounding the investigations of atmospheric effects.
The baseline scenario used 6500 Mt, with 1500 Mt
detonated at ground level and 5000 Mt detonated at altitudes
chosen to maximize blast damage. Of this 5000 Mt, 1500 Mt
was directed at military, economic and political targets
that coincidentally lie in or near about 1000 of the largest
urban areas. This scenario became the basis for many
subsequent analyses. A set of mid-range scientifically
plausible baseline physical parameters (e.g. , how much smoke
is produced) , were chosen to calculate the environmental
effects of the nuclear exchange. The TTAPS model was
applied to this baseline case in order to relate the results
of both studies and to compare the TTAPS report to the NRC
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baseline when multidimensional modeling was used. The
rainout removal rate profile provides an example of the
different assumptions initially made in both studies. The
TTAPS group chose baseline values designed to represent the
rainout characteristics of the unperturbed atmosphere. The
NRC values were modified so that faster rainout occurs in
the lower troposphere (0 to 5 km) and no rainout occurs
above 5 km in an attempt to simulate possible effects of
changes in static stability. [Ref. 16:pp. 136,137]
The NRC report concluded that it was not possible to
estimate the most probable average temperature changes at
the surface caused by injected smoke and dust. Any single
value would be meaningless due to the large uncertainties of
many of the physical parameters, limitations of the models
used for computer simulations, and the probable wide range
in seasonal and geographic differences. [Ref. 2: p. 8] In
general, the report agreed with the TTAPS study, concluding:
A major nuclear exchange would insert significant
amounts of smoke, fine dust, and undesirable species into
the atmosphere. These depositions could result in
dramatic perturbations of the atmosphere lasting over a
period of at least a few weeks. Estimation of the
amounts, vertical distributions, and the subsequent fates
of these materials involves large uncertainties.
Furthermore, accurate detailed accounts of the response of
the atmosphere, the redistribution and removal of the
distributions, and the duration of a greatly degraded
environment lie beyond the present state of knowledge.
Nevertheless, the committee finds that, unless one or
more of the effects lie near the less severe end of their
uncertainty ranges, or unless some mitigating effect has
been overlooked, there is a clear possibility that great
portions of the land areas of the northern temperate zone
(and perhaps a large segment of the planet) could be
severely affected. Possible impacts include major
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temperature reductions (particularly for an exchange that
occurs in the summer) lasting for weeks, with subnormal
temperatures persisting for months. The impact of these
temperature reductions and associated meteorological
changes on the surviving population, and on the biosphere
that supports the survivors could be severe, and deserves
careful independent study. [Ref. 16:pp. 6,7]
The NRC study presented the uncertainties in a context
which improved an understanding of their impact. It
provided a thorough review of the existing knowledge and
provided the necessary qualifications to the conclusions
that could be drawn. The manner in which the study was
presented stressed the complexities of the problem and
attracted further interest by the scientific community.
C. SCOPE REPORT
The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)
includes 20 disciplinary international scientific unions and
66 national academies including those of the United States,
the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, France, and
others. In 1982, ICSU tasked its Scientific Committee on
Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) to "prepare a report for
wide dissemination that would be an unemotional, nonpoliti-
cal, authoritative and readily understandable statement of
the effects of nuclear war, even a limited one, on human
beings and on other parts of the biosphere." [Ref. 22 :p.
52] The SCOPE findings were released in two volumes in late
1985, the first covering the physical and atmospheric
effects with the second covering biological and other
ecological effects.
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The volume on atmospheric effects provides a
comprehensive synthesis of results from existing research.
By the time this study was published, modeling had advanced
to the point that simulations portrayed the interaction
between the absorption of solar radiation by the smoke
particles and atmospheric motions, smoke dispersion from its
initial source as opposed to uniformly distributed smoke as
an initial condition, and scavenging rates determined by
more advanced computations. In summarizing the status of
the climatic consequences of a nuclear war, the report
states that "No new and substantial work (as opposed to some
qualitative expressions of criticism) has lessened the
probability that a major nuclear exchange would cause severe
environmental effects. ..." [Ref. 2:p. 196]
The overall conclusions, which represent a strong
consensus of hundreds of scientists from over 3 nations
involved in the project, are as follows:
1. Average Northern Hemisphere land surface temperatures,
beneath dense smoke patches, could decrease by 20°-
40°C, below normal, in continental areas within a few
days, depending on the duration of the dense smoke and
the particular meteorological state of the atmosphere.
During the initial period of smoke dispersion,
temperature anomalies could be spatially and
temporarily quite variable while patchy smoke clouds
strongly modulate the insolation reaching the surface.
2. For spring to early fall injections, solar heating of
the particles could rapidly warm the elevated smoke
layer. The warming could stabilize the atmosphere and
suppress vertical movement of the air below these
layers.
3. Strong solar heating of smoke injected into the
Northern Hemisphere between April and September would
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destabilize the atmosphere and increase the vertical
motion of the air above those layers, thus carrying
the smoke upwards and equatorward.
4. Average summertime land surface temperatures in the
Northern Hemisphere midlatitudes could drop to levels
typical of fall or early winter for periods of weeks
or more with convective precipitation being
essentially eliminated. [Ref. 2:pp. xxxiv-xxxvi]
It is noted that many of the conclusions support the
speculations made in the earliest studies.
D. NCAR REPORT (198 6)
The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) has
been involved in this type of climatic effect studies for
several years. The most recent study by Thompson and
Schneider [Ref. 23:pp. 981-1005] indicate less severe
reductions in surface temperatures than indicated in
previous studies. These findings are related to the use of
three dimensional interactive models, and a revision of the
assumptions concerning the amount of dust and smoke injected
into the troposphere and stratosphere. The study uses more
conservative assumptions of low altitude smoke injection and
of more rapid smoke washout. Results indicate that minimum
July temperatures in the northern mid-latitudes would range
between 7° and 12°C, with coastal areas experiencing little
effect. This significant mitigation of surface cooling
reflects considerations for the large heat capacity of the
oceans, a more rapid removal of smoke (75 percent in 30
days) , and the infrared greenhouse effect caused by the
39
smoke. The ocean effect is the major factor. [Ref. 24 :p.
619]
Although the predictions indicate smaller immediate
effects (within 1-30 days) the scientists speculated that
the long term effects (months to years) could be worse than
previously anticipated. Long term effects might include the
onset of a late spring and early fall as well as possible
disruption of the monsoons. [Ref. 24 :p. 620] Such effects
could greatly hamper agricultural recovery efforts.
E. LLNL REPORT (1987)
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has
also been involved in climatic studies for the past several
years. A recent study supports the previous speculation
that precipitation patterns might be altered. Performed
under the auspices of the Department of Energy, this study
examined the global-scale response for a summertime (July)
scenario. A two-level tropospheric general circulation
model was applied to the scenario and run for 30 days. The
findings indicate that land precipitation is very sensitive
to the amount of smoke injected into the atmosphere.
Significant reductions in summertime precipitation may occur
for even small smoke injections. The sensitivity in the
midlatitude summer may be due to the reduced surface
evaporation caused by suppressed mixing of the surface air
with the upper tropospheric air. The authors caution that
results may be model-dependent. This particular model is
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extremely limited in its vertical resolution. This
criticism points out a concern for the type of model used,
its sensitivities and resolution. Such concerns must be
considered in an evaluation of any atmospheric study. [Ref.
2 5
: pp . 3 8,39]
F. OCEAN RESPONSE MODEL (1987)
As the above studies indicated, the oceans have been
found to play an important role in the atmospheric
simulations. Models capable of realistically including the
effect of the ocean's large heat capacity on the atmosphere
predict less severe temperature reductions at the earth's
surface. This study, in which a model atmosphere provided
the forcing (winds and heating) to a model ocean,
investigates the response of the ocean's mixed layer to the
hypothetical atmospheric effects of a major nuclear
exchange. An examination of the ocean's response to a
"nuclear winter" is important because of the possibly large
feedback processes that might occur. Such feedback
processes would involve the complex interrelationships
between the sea-surface temperatures (SST) , energy fluxes,
precipitation, and cloud formation. [Ref. 26:pp. 9,10]
The atmosphere was represented by a two-level general
circulation atmospheric model in both a control and a
nuclear winter simulation. The ocean was represented by a
one-dimensional mixed layer model applied at six different
locations in the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans.
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The results indicate that the upper ocean experiences a
significant cooling (several degrees centigrade) in response
to a large scale nuclear war depending on the distance of
the point in question from the nearest source of smoke.
This study investigated the short-term (30-day) response of
the ocean. The authors do not speculate on the significance
of the results. [Ref. 27:pp. 1967-1974] This study is
included because it portrays an additional consideration for
the complex interactions of the earth's climate systems.
G. BIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The research presented thus far has focused on
investigating the effects a nuclear war might have on the
earth's atmosphere and ocean. A discussion of the risks of
nuclear war would be incomplete without stressing the direct
association a change in the earth's climate might have on
the earth's ecosystems. Any combination of the nuclear
winter effects (reduced sunlight, temperature, or rainfall)
that are considered plausible as a consequence of nuclear
war would impact the primary producers in the food chain
upon which all organisms, including man, are dependent.
Although research on the potential biological and
agricultural implications that could arise from a nuclear
winter scenario has been limited to date, that which has
been conducted attempts to address the following key issues:
1) Effect of sustained low light on plant physiology; 2)
Plant stress response to an unnatural sudden or slow
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temperature decrease; and 3) Recovery ability of the
ecosystems [Ref. 28:p. 24]. The biologists' problems in
addressing such concerns are considered even more perplexing
than those of the physical scientists studying climatic
effects. The biologist must deal with a mosaic of
ecosystems that cannot be easily described mathematically.
[Ref. 29:p. 576]
The possible effects of nuclear war consequences to the
physical environment on particular species has been
investigated over the past few decades. 5 Volume II of the
SCOPE findings, "Ecological and Agricultural Effects ,
"
represents the most comprehensive study conducted dealing
with the possible impact of atmospheric and climatic changes
proposed by the nuclear winter concept. As mentioned
earlier, the SCOPE report is a culmination of nearly two
years of work and the efforts of hundreds of scientists from
over 3 nations. The conclusions of the SCOPE report
include:
- Natural ecosystems are vulnerable to climatic
disturbances with differential vulnerability.
Temperature effects would be dominant for terrestrial
ecosystems in the Northern Hemisphere and in tropics and
sub-tropics; light reductions would be most important
for oceanic systems; precipitation effects would be more
important to grasslands and many Southern Hemisphere
ecosystems.
- The potential for synergistic responses and propagation
effects through ecosystems implies much greater impacts
5Examples of such research include: Fosberg 1959,
Beatley 1966, Romney et al. 1971, Whicker and Schultz 1982,
Hansen et al. 1983, and Harwell 1984 [Ref. 29:pp. 576-583].
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than indicated from investigating any single
disturbance.
- Recovery of natural ecosystems from the climatic
stresses would depend on normal adaptations to
disturbance (i.e., presence of spores, seed banks,
vegetative growth) . For some systems the initial damage
would be very great and recovery unlikely. Human-
ecosystem interactions could retard ecological recovery.
- Natural ecosystems have limitations in the amounts of
utilizable energy they provide. Natural ecosystems
cannot replace agricultural systems in supporting the
majority of humans on earth.
- As a consequence of the above fact, humans are highly
vulnerable to disruptions in agricultural systems.
- Agricultural systems are very sensitive to climatic and
societal disturbances occurring on regional to global
scales, with reductions in or even total loss of crop
yields possible in response to many of the potential
stresses.
- The high sensitivity of agricultural systems to even
relatively small climatic alterations impart devastating
consequences to even the lower estimates of nuclear
winter effects. 6
- As a consequence of the potential disruptions in
agricultural productivity and in the exchange of food
across national boundaries in the aftermath of a nuclear
war, the majority of the world's population would be at
risk of starvation. [Ref. 31:pp. xxxi-xxxiii]
Although physical scientists have identified factors
that could increase or decrease the severity of climatic
changes, biologists and ecologists have pointed out that an
average temperature drop of even a few degrees and short-
term "quick freezes" could eliminate one or more
60ne scientist participating in the SCOPE study stated,
"From the biologists' standpoint, even if the physical
scientists are wrong by a factor of 10 or maybe even a
factor of 100, we're still talking about a catastrophe."
[Ref. 30:p. 540]
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crop-growing seasons and injure or kill tropical species.
Paul Ehrlich has commented that much "... uncertainty in
the debate is dampened by the extraordinary sensitivity of
living organisms." [Ref. 32 :p. 5]
H. UNCERTAINTIES IN THE NUCLEAR WINTER HYPOTHESIS
The studies reviewed give an indication of the
advancements which have been made in applied atmospheric
modeling. There are still, of necessity, many
simplifications and assumptions of physical processes made
in the models. Although the uncertainties may be reduced by
further research, they will not be eliminated. A discussion
of the major uncertainties follows.
1. Adequacy of the Atmospheric Models
As mentioned earlier, each model has its own
limitations. It is the sensitivity and the resolution of
the models which generate most of the scientific criticism
of any particular study. The most highly resolved models
are more physically comprehensive. Simpler models may help
to illustrate basic physical principles and the relative
importance of individual factors, while the more comprehen-
sive models are used to provide geographic detail or
interactive processes. The most reliable procedure is to
repeat climatic sensitivity experiments using several
different models and constantly compare the results. As
mentioned in the SCOPE report, this approach has been used
45
by many independent climatic modeling groups, culminating in
the synthesis of results presented in their report.
The complexity of the models and the expense of
running the highly sophisticated computer programs has
resulted in the majority of studies being limited to only
the short-term effects, i.e. approximately 30 days.
Scientists stress the importance of additional studies which
would address long term effects, as computer capabilities
expand.
The atmospheric models necessary to research the
climatic effects of a nuclear exchange have many other
contemporary applications (e.g., ozone depletion and acid
rain studies) . The high interest in these combined areas
will surely add to the continued demand for improved
modeling.
2 . Properties of Smoke and Dust; How Much. How High.
How Long?
Naturally occurring events, such as volcanic
eruptions and large forest fires, help determine plausible
estimates of smoke and dust properties. However, as
analogies their usefulness must be qualified. For example,
a volcanic eruption produces particulates of a much
different chemical composition than does a fire. These
differences will affect the transport and absorptive
properties. While accounts of "the year without a summer,"
following the Tambora eruption in 1815, provide some
possible clues, it must also be noted that such accounts do
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not qualify as scientific data. without such data it is
impossible to discount other factors, such as naturally
occurring climatic variation, which may have caused the cool
temperatures following the eruption.
Data obtained from observing forest fires has been
used to estimate the amount of smoke produced and the
physical properties of such smoke. It is noted that the
burning of cities will produce the largest amounts of smoke
due to the greater concentration of combustibles. For
plausible smoke estimates, one must first consider the
expected fire development and spread characteristics. This
determination will be dependent on the yield and burst point
of the nuclear weapon, weather conditions, fuel distribution
patterns, etc.
3 . The Nuclear War Scenario
The human choices which determine the strategy of a
nuclear war will remain an unknown. The early studies
started with a hypothetical war scenario. The TTAPS study
was criticized for using individual weapon yields which were
too high, and not representative of today's arsenals. The
NRC study corrected this part of the war scenario.
Subsequently, the war scenarios used have been accepted as
being plausible, given our knowledge of the U.S. and Soviet
Union strategies. The more recent studies differ from their
predecessors in starting with a hypothetical quantity of
smoke and dust in the atmosphere rather than a hypothetical
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war scenario. It is suggested that this change reflects an
emphasis on the scientific approach—what happens once the
particles are in the atmosphere. One of the authors of the
TTAPS study, Carl Sagan, was quick to express policy
implications—more easily addressed when one's study speaks
in terms of units used for arms control negotiations, e.g.,
numbers of warheads.
The war scenario will determine the numbers and
yields of weapons, how the weapons are targeted
(geographical locations, as well as height from surface)
,
and when the war occurs (the season and prevailing weather
conditions at the time) . Thus, the war scenario will be a
major factor in determining the parameters concerning the
physical properties of the smoke and dust particles, the
scavenging process, and the transport.
I. SUMMARY
The scientific literature reviewed in this chapter
represents some of the major studies in the evolution of the
nuclear winter hypothesis. The review was intended to
provide not only a summary of the research but also to
illustrate the wide number of scientists and institutions
involved in this area of ongoing investigation.
Valid scientific criticism of the studies centers on the
assumptions and uncertainties, and the need for refinement.
Criticism of another non-scientific nature has frequently
focused on comparing the results of the TTAPS report to
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those of the more recent NCAR study, without a full
understanding of either work. Apparently these criticisms
are an attempt to disparage the entire nuclear winter
hypothesis by focusing on an incomplete intepretation of one
of the first reports.
Although the recent studies, most notably the NCAR
research by Thompson and Schneider, have concluded that the
climatic change would be more mild than initially proposed
in the TTAPS report, thus lessening the apocalyptic
forecasts, all of the studies confirm the basic principles
of the hypothesis. There has been no scientific research
which refutes the likelihood of climatic change as a
consequence of nuclear war. All studies indicate a
consensus of plausibility of the nuclear winter hypothesis.
All studies also state that the impact of the climatic
change, even in the modest range, would cause catastrophic
consequences to the ecology of our earth. The uncertainties
involve the degree of severity of the nuclear winter
effects.
The evolution of the nuclear winter research reflects
the evolution of computer and modeling sophistication.
Although the research has shown significant refinement, the
number of uncertainties discussed point out areas for
continued research. A key concept in attempting to
understand the possibilities is to recognize the
uncertainties of the many independent variables and to
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recognize the many unknowns surrounding synergistic effects.
This understanding has led scientists to conclude that the
concept of a threshold (a number of warheads or megatonnage,
above which nuclear war would cause the onset of nuclear
winter and below which no nuclear winter would occur) , was a
product of simplified models, and in fact, no such threshold
can be stated at the present time. Many scientists have
indicated that if a threshold could be stated it should most
likely be stated in terms of the amount of smoke, soot, and
dust particles injected into the atmosphere rather than in
numbers of warheads or megatonnage [Ref. 28:p. 17].
The nuclear winter research has only been able to
indicate the range of possible environmental effects and has
indicated that such effects must be given serious considera-
tion as a severe consequence of nuclear war. It must be
recognized that some uncertainties will always remain. The
ongoing research will continue to provide the plausible
range of consequences and a necessary assessment of one more
dimension of the risks of nuclear war.
Advancements in science and technology now offer policy
makers information on the effects of nuclear weapons which
were not available when the nuclear powers formulated their
policies of national security based on nuclear weapons. The
next chapter will present the variety of policy issues which
are being questioned in response to the new information
embodied in the nuclear winter hypothesis.
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III. THE POLICY ISSUES
The nuclear winter hypothesis, since its initial debut
in the TTAPS report, continues to generate debate over the
link between scientific research and policy regarding
nuclear weapons. A wide variety of policy implications have
been proposed by a wide variety of commentators, reaching
widely divergent conclusions.
The interpretations have ranged from declaring that the
nuclear winter hypothesis demands a strategic revolution to
declaring that nuclear winter offers nothing new—or that
the uncertainties are too great to even consider
implications for policy. Among some, there was a sense of
hope that this new information would force the nuclear
powers to limit, reduce and destroy their nuclear arsenals.
Thomas Powers, responding to the TTAPS report, stated,
11
. . . the nuclear winter thesis, if valid, threatens to
make nonsense of every notion the planners have managed to
come up with, in forty years of trying to devise a sensible
way to fight a nuclear war." [Ref. 33 :p. 59] At the other
end of the spectrum, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) criticized a report submitted to Congress by
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) for its
presentation of policy issues, stating, "The desire to
answer policy issues without first understanding the basic
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science associated with the climate tends to give more
validity to the nuclear winter theory than is warranted."
[Ref. 28 :p. 52] This leads to the question of what criteria
of basic scientific understanding should be reached before
considering policy implications.
The nuclear winter hypothesis caused a flurry of policy
debate because of its several unique aspects. It presents a
consideration of long-term environmental effects which had
previously been unanticipated. The initial TTAPS report
stressed the possibility of the extinction of the human
species. Although subsequent scientific research relegates
the extinction of the human species to a very low
probability, the research continues to stress the probable
devastating environmental effects.
Another unique aspect deals with the possibility of a
relatively small exchange, or even a one-sided preemptive
attack, causing serious climatic change. This concept was
most explicitly stated in the TTAPS study for a scenario
involving a 100 Mt countervalue attack. Subsequent studies
do not attempt to quantify the megatonnage, but the range of
uncertainty still leaves room for the possibility of a
relatively small attack setting off nuclear winter. The
state of uncertainty is likely to remain with an unknown set
of parameters determining a continuum of climatic
deterioration.
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The final unique aspect is the predicted global nature
of the nuclear winter hypothesis. Countries not directly-
involved, and far removed geographically, were previously
expected to suffer economic consequences of a Northern
Hemisphere nuclear exchange. Climatic change would bring
direct suffering to non-participants on a new scale. Some
analysts feel that the increased probability of global human
suffering places greater moral demands on nuclear powers to
revise nuclear policy. The global nature of the
consequences also increase the importance of the nuclear
winter hypothesis as a foreign policy issue.
A 1986 policy study, commissioned by Dr. Richard Wagner,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) , and
conducted by the Airpower Research Institute, Center for
Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, investigated the
policy implications of nuclear winter for a low, medium and
high threshold, assuming that the level of nuclear combat
threshold would eventually be usefully defined. The authors
made several important assumptions: 1) Conflicts between
states will continue to occur and the U.S. must be prepared
to deter aggression or, should deterrence fail, be able to
successfully prosecute military conflicts; 2) All current
nuclear powers will have as an objective the prevention of
nuclear winter; however, any nation might gamble with
causing nuclear winter if faced with a desperate situation
in which national survival was at stake; and, 3) When the
53
level of effort required to produce nuclear winter is
defined, it will be universally understood and accepted.
[Ref. 34:pp. 4,5]
Assumption one does not require the acceptance of a
drastic change in world order leading to the cessation of
international tensions that is often proposed by those who
make radical proposals for disarmament. Assumptions two and
three, however, are not likely to be realized in the
scientific aspect or within the realm of differing
objectives and doctrines of national security. The authors
note this possibility and indicate that without the
assumptions the "matrix for analysis becomes unwieldy and
confusing." [Ref. 34 :p. 5] This paper will not be based on
the acceptance of assumptions two and three. It will,
instead, be set in the present context of scientific
uncertainty and uncertainty in knowing another nation's
objectives.
Within this acknowledged "unwieldy and confusing matrix"
the policy issues which have been proposed by policy
analysts and scientists will be presented in this chapter.
The policy issues surrounding the nuclear winter hypothesis,
although prompted by new information and some unique
concerns, are basically a continuation of concerns and
questions of the past 40 years of the nuclear era. An
analysis of the proposals must take into account a
historical perspective of our pursuit for national security,
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as well as an awareness of the Soviet perspective. In
addition to responses intended to lessen the likelihood of
climatic change as a result of nuclear war, other responses
are made in response to the political implications for
foreign policy which must be dealt with (as the theory
becomes well enough known to affect world perceptions)
,
whether or not the hypothesis is ever validated.
A. DETERRENCE
The goal of U.S. nuclear strategy is to prevent
(nuclear) war by maintaining deterrence. U.S. deterrence
policy is based on the survivability of strategic forces and
the ability of these forces to inflict unacceptable damage
on the attacker in retaliation. Does the nuclear winter
hypothesis challenge nuclear deterrence in a unique way?
The different responses to this question highlight the
ambiguities which surround the concept of nuclear
deterrence. There is, certainly, widespread belief in the
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence—the general idea of
which has remained reasonably constant in operational U.S.
strategic thinking. The success of deterrence, however,
cannot be proved. A nuclear war has not occurred in 4
years, but whether or not this fact can be attributed to the
role of nuclear deterrence is an unknown. Thomas
Schnelling, one of the best known early theorists of
deterrence, commented in 1960 that,
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What is impressive is not how complicated the idea of
deterrence has become, and how carefully it has been
refined and developed, but how slow the progress has been,
how vague the concepts still are, and how inelegant the
current theory of deterrence is. [Ref. 35: p. 40]
The challenges the nuclear winter hypothesis has placed
on the deterrence theory may not have raised new questions,
but it has definitely emphasized a new look at old
questions.
1. Deterrence Enhanced
The uncertainties of nuclear warfare were considered
significant before the TTAPS report of 1983. The
possibility of nuclear winter consequences adds to those
uncertainties and supports the position that the unknown
effects may be more important, and more harmful, than the
known prompt effects. As the uncertainties of cost versus
gain increase, the incentives to initiate use of nuclear
weapons could be reduced for fear of escalation to a level
of conflict causing the onset of nuclear winter. As already
indicated, the level of conflict, or threshold, which will
cause the onset of nuclear winter is likely to remain an
unknown. Carl Sagan, noting the heavy forestation and urban
density of central Europe, warns of the possibility that
even a limited use of tactical nuclear weapons could bring
about climatic change. [Ref. 36:p. 9] The increased level
of uncertainty makes it more difficult for an aggressor to
calculate the positive results from aggression and even
easier to miscalculate those results. The absence of the
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ability to calculate success would be interpreted as
reinforcing deterrence by those who believe uncertainty
enhances deterrence. [Ref. 34 :p. 74]
The probability of environmental devastation, adding
to the already contemplated horrors of war, could in itself
act to deter a nuclear war. This perspective is easily
accepted by the American public and is one of the underlying
assumptions of those who propose drastic cuts in the nuclear
arsenal. According to recent polls, some 80 percent of the
American public expects that it would perish if a nuclear
war between the United States and the Soviet Union were to
occur [Ref. 37:p. 124]. Proponents of the "mutual assured
destruction" (MAD) concept, who believe that nuclear weapons
have no operational value as weapons of war, welcome the
nuclear winter hypothesis as underlining the truth in their
position—there is no defense and no escape from the
devastation of nuclear war. In this perspective, the impact
of self-deterrence becomes of increasing significance to
U.S. declaratory policy which has exhibited, throughout the
nuclear era, a significant emphasis on the assured
destructionist school of thought. A nation which accepts
the MAD philosophy will be deterred more easily; i.e., will
be deterred from entering into conflicts by the fear of use
of any (its own or the adversary's) nuclear weapons,
regardless of the particular strategy and force structure of
an adversary.
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2 . Credibility of Nuclear Deterrent Questioned
The U.S. deterrent policy, based on the ability to
inflict unacceptable damage on the opponent and the
capability to deny him his military-political objectives,
requires adequate military forces and the perception (by the
opponent) that the U.S. will use these forces. U.S.
declaratory policy moved away from an emphasis on assured
destruction as the deterrent because a choice between
surrender or suicide was not credible. Nuclear winter is
perceived by some as reason to challenge the United States'
move toward an emphasis on a warfighting capability. If
even limited nuclear use brings about devastating climatic
change, the threat of use becomes less credible due to its
suicidal consequences. If the United States' acceptance of
the hypothesis increases the role of self-deterrence, as
could be manifested in unilateral arms reductions, it is
likely that the perception factor of credibility will be
lessened in the Soviet Union's view of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
An understanding of the perception factor of
deterrence requires an appreciation of Soviet doctrine.
Many commentators have written on the dangers of asymmetric
acceptance of the nuclear winter hypothesis. The danger of
asymmetry in doctrines has been with us all along, and will
continue to be a problem even if both the U.S. and the
Soviet Union accepted the probability of serious climatic
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consequences following a nuclear exchange. Soviet deterrent
attitudes do not include the acceptance of mutual
vulnerability. It is very unlikely that the Soviet Union
would involve itself in any actions which would increase its
(perceived) vulnerability to the West. On the other hand,
it would surely exploit any such "weakness" evidenced by the
West.
3 . The Onset of War
The above discussions describe a pre-war world where
calculations and risk assessment are conducted. Such
descriptions characterize the "rational" model for the onset
of war as proposed in the book Hawks. Doves and Owls by
Allison, Carnesale and Nye. The authors propose two models,
the deliberate (or rational) and the inadvertent. These two
paths to war are likely to be influenced differently by the
nuclear winter hypothesis. As indicated, nuclear winter is
likely to have contradictory effects on the rational model.
The second model, that of inadvertent war, stresses
the importance of non-rational factors occurring in a crisis
situation. In a crisis condition, political leaders would
be under great psychological stress, and would have little
time to cope with the effects of any accidents, mispercep-
tions or organizational breakdowns that might occur. These
stress factors would probably outweigh the role of careful
calculations and the consideration of such consequences as
nuclear winter. If this is true, then it does not appear
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that nuclear winter would be a significant factor entering
into the probability of a nuclear war under the crisis
situation. [Ref. 38:pp. 120,121]
Indeed, most all of our detailed considerations of
deterrence failure might be irrelevant in the inadvertent
model which becomes overpowered by non-rational factors.
However, this does not negate the grave importance of our
current system of stability. Our system influences the day
to day outcome of foreign relations and provides us with the
existing safeguards to decrease the likelihood of war.
4 . And If Nuclear Winter Deters the Use of Nuclear
Weapons . . .
The final perspective on deterrence that will be
presented is one in which it is speculated that the nuclear
winter hypothesis may have such a significant impact that
the use of nuclear weapons would be considered an
unacceptable option. Conflicts between states will continue
to occur and will require a nation to be prepared to deter
aggression. Deterrence, then, would be based on
conventional forces, and this approach demands that the West
strengthen its conventional forces.
Conventional force improvements for NATO were under
consideration prior to the advent of nuclear winter
concerns. Budgetary considerations were a key factor in
acceptance of a NATO policy which relied on nuclear weapons,
and they continue to be the key reason for the lack of
expanded conventional capabilities. It is generally agreed
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today that trends are taking place that are changing the
conventional balance in a direction favorable to the Warsaw
Pact. The balance of Soviet forces, both nuclear and
conventional, is an important characteristic of the Soviet
threat. Whether or not nuclear weapons continue to be
viewed as an option, improved conventional forces should be
pursued to avoid being merely a "trip-wire" to a nuclear
exchange and to provide the West with a balanced and
credible deterrent.
B. RELATIONS WITH ALLIED AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES
In the past, many countries could look at the prospect
of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the
Soviet Union without feeling that they would be directly
involved. The nuclear winter hypothesis indicates that
climatic change would be global, with all nations
experiencing environmental consequences. Regardless of the
scientific conclusions, other nations now have a keen
interest in how the nuclear powers, particularly the United
States and the Soviet Union, address the issue.
The nuclear winter hypothesis is likely to increase the
already existing ambivalence about the American nuclear
guarantee to Europe. Acceptance of the nuclear winter
concept could strengthen the link between the U.S. and
European security by substantially decreasing the
possibility that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could escape
devastation by confining a nuclear war to Europe, and
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therefore decreasing the possibility of war. Alternatively,
the link could be weakened if it is perceived that the U.S.
and Soviet Union would confine any aggressions in Europe at
the conventional level. This would still have disastrous
consequences for Europe but would avoid triggering a global
nuclear winter. This perception could contribute toward
producing a (further) crisis of confidence within the NATO
Alliance. [Ref. 39 :p. 16] The dilemmas of extended
deterrence are not substantially changed but the problems of
confidence within the NATO Alliance could be heightened.
The Soviets could take advantage of this situation to gain
leverage over the U.S. and to exacerbate existing tensions.
Southern hemisphere countries have also expressed
concern. Notably, scientists from Australia and New Zealand
have conducted their own research with specific emphasis on
the atmospheric alterations in the southern hemisphere.
Australia and New Zealand would be about the least severely
affected countries because of the less severe effects in the
southern hemisphere and because of the normally large food
surpluses. An Australian scientist speculates, " . . .we
would likely be almost the only surviving organized
societies. ..." which leads him to coin the term 'Lifeboat
Australia'. [Ref. 40:p. 24] Russell Seitz, a fellow at
Harvard's Center for International Affairs, offers frequent
criticism of the methods and results of the nuclear winter
research. Seitz claims that the popular version of nuclear
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winter is partly responsible for the antiweapons movement in
Australia and New Zealand. [Ref. 41:p. 271]
Another point of view on policy and foreign relations
was expressed in a memorandum for Admiral Watkins which
summarized a March 1985 NAS symposium on nuclear winter.
The author of the memorandum, a U.S. Navy Captain, stated,
"While the fact that Nigeria or Brazil or other nations will
be damaged in a nuclear exchange is irrelevant to military
planning, it has implications for peacetime foreign policy.
There is much which needs to be done here, but not by the
Department of Defense." [Ref. 42:pp. 1,2] This view
neglects the impact that statements from the Department of
Defense and a knowledge of military planning can have on
foreign policy. If the U.S. appears reticent and the Soviet
Union appears to be responsive to the devastation implied by
the research, the Soviet Union will have made positive gains
in world opinion. The implications for U.S. foreign policy
should take into consideration the significance of Third
World activities as viewed by the Soviet Union. Lenin spoke
of the Third World as "the weak link in the imperialist
chain." The Third World countries continue to be
significant to Soviet ambitions.
Some analysts speculate on another foreign relations
aspect of nuclear winter. Recognizing that there may be
areas in the southern hemisphere less affected by environ-
mental damage following a war, these areas would be a vital
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source for post-war reconstitution needs. Our actions now
might help determine the willingness to offer resources
later. However, determining an outcome can be accomplished
diplomatically or through coercion. Perhaps the belligerent
nation with a surviving nuclear force would receive the best
response in acquiring 'aid' in its reconstitution efforts.
Expressions of concern over nuclear winter have not been
as numerous as might have been expected initially, but they
are in evidence. "The Delhi Declaration" of January 28,
1985, signed by Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden
and Greece stated: "Nuclear war, even on a limited scale,
would trigger an arctic nuclear winter which may transform
the Earth into a darkened, frozen planet, posing
unprecedented peril to all nations, even those far removed
from the nuclear explosions." [Ref. 23: p. 1005] Although
the declaration expresses an extreme version of nuclear
winter which might be considered unrealistic in scientific
terms, the possible impact on foreign relations is a
reality. The SCOPE meetings provided an excellent forum for
generating international awareness. Subsequently, the
United Nations has had two resolutions introduced that
express interest in gaining additional scientific knowledge
on the nuclear winter hypothesis. 7
7These include U.N. #A/C. 1/39/L. 22 "Resolution on
Nuclear Winter," introduced by India, Mexico, Pakistan,
Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia; and #A/C. 1/39/L. 69/Rev. 1,
"Studies on Climatic Effects of Nuclear War Including the
Possibility of Nuclear Winter," introduced by Belgium,
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C. NUCLEAR ARSENALS
The nuclear winter hypothesis implies that the use of
man's nuclear weapons technology could result in devastating
changes to the physical and biological processes which have
evolved over the earth's history of approximately 4.5
billion years. The hypothesis introduces the prospect of
creating conditions that would inhibit even the most
optimistic reconstitution outlook. If man created the
technology that threatens his own survival, cannot man
control that technology and remove the threat? The answer
of how to control the technology ranges from attempting to
disinvent it, to attempts to improve upon it.
1. Arms Reduction
Arms control has played an increased role of
importance in U.S. strategic policy since the U.S. lost is
unquestioned nuclear superiority in the 1960s. As
increasing Soviet capabilities were gradually acknowledged,
the role of arms control increased in importance in the U.S.
view of maintaining peace. According to U.S. conventional
wisdom, the emergence of National Technical Means (NTM)
particularly space-based reconnaissance, enhanced monitoring
skills to the point that meaningful arms control agreements
were possible. It is not surprising that arms control would
again be invoked to help resolve the concerns of nuclear
winter effects. Any evaluation of the success of arms
Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan.
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control must take into account the objectives and intentions
of the participating countries as well as the difficulties
involved in achieving acceptable compliance and the limita-
tions of the NTM.
Carl Sagan feels that his research points ". . .to
one apparently inescapable conclusion: the necessity of
moving as rapidly as possible to reduce the global nuclear
arsenals." [Ref. 18 :p. 11] Using his estimated threshold
of 500-2000 warheads results in requiring a 90 percent
reduction. This reduced arsenal would be " . . .of the same
order as the arsenals that were publicly announced in the
1950s and 1960s as an unmistakable strategic deterrent and
as sufficient to destroy the U.S. or the Soviet Union
'irrecoverably'." [Ref. 21:p. 51] This reasoning
illustrates a minimal deterrence philosophy which perceives
changes in the strategic balance of the past 2 years as
inconsequential. It ignores strategic modernization, the
need for a survivable strategic reserve, and a Soviet
doctrine which does not accept the Western view of assured
destruction. In general, proponents of massive reductions
believe: 1) a nuclear war cannot remain limited but will
quickly escalate to an all-out exchange; 2) mutual assured
destruction is what deters; and 3) there is no significance
to strategic superiority.
Despite the importance of a stated threshold for
establishing policy, the present scientific consensus is
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that a threshold cannot be stated
—
particularly not in terms
of numbers of warheads, i.e., the unit used in current arms
control negotiations. The inability of scientific research
to state a threshold does not lessen support for reductions,
since those who propose such suggestions equate fewer
weapons with less likelihood of war. Criticisms of massive
arms reduction proposals include the following:
- it would be difficult to verify exactly what level of
reductions had been made.
- it might be perceived that nuclear war would be safer to
wage given reduced arsenals, or the prospects of waging
a conventional war might be more likely.
- other nations might choose to strive for superpower
status by attaining or increasing nuclear capabilities,
thus creating greater world instability. [Ref. 28: pp.
30,31]
A major consideration in arms reductions must be the
Soviet objective. If they do not share the same goal, and
do not perceive deterrence in the same manner, the U.S.
would likely be faced with an inequitable agreement or even
unilateral reductions. Concerns over avoiding a nuclear
winter may play a role in future arms control negotiations
by further lessening the U.S. consideration for nuclear
superiority. Such agreements would inevitably affect U.S.
vulnerability and must be viewed as to what effect the
changes would have on increasing the probability of war.
2 . New Technologies
A different perspective, which attempts to maintain
present stability without drastic changes in the world
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system, suggests incorporating the implications of nuclear
winter into present force planning through continued
modernization efforts. This involves the reduction of the
older, higher yield stockpiles and a trend to low yield,
high accuracy weapons. A reduction in total megatonnage and
of total yield of individual warheads results. It is often
erroneously believed that efforts to modernize the U.S.
nuclear stockpile have led to an escalating yield and number
of weapons. In fact, the exact opposite is true. The
relative total yield of the U.S. stockpile in 1985 was
reduced fourfold from its peak value in the mid-60s.
Modernization played a major role in reducing the yield of
the stockpile. This reduction is largely the result of
increased accuracy of the delivery systems. In the past,
high yields were preferred as the means of destruction
against hard targets. Increased accuracy has made it
possible to develop and deploy warheads of lower yield.
[Ref. 43:p. 11]
Among the new technologies frequently cited are
earth-penetrating weapons (EPW) and enhanced-radiation
weapons (neutron bombs) . Warheads detonated at the surface
expend most of their energy in the air and relatively little
in producing the ground shock needed to affect deeply buried
structures. The EPW couples a larger fraction of its energy
into the ground than does a surface-burst weapon, thus the
enhanced ground-motion effects are more effective against
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highly reinforced or deeply buried targets. [Ref. 44 :p. 4]
The EPW would be an effective weapon against hardened silos
and would also minimize fires, soot and stratospheric dust.
The neutron bomb, conceived and partially developed
by American scientists in the 1960s, depends mainly on
penetrating radiation for its destructive power instead of
relying on blast and fire. The amount of dust, soot and
smoke which contribute to creating a nuclear winter would be
greatly diminished. The prospects of production of the
neutron bomb were stimulated in the 1970s as the Soviet
ground threat in Europe became more pronounced. Even at
this time, prior to nuclear winter research, the neutron
bomb should have been more acceptable to the people of
Western Europe as it was far less indiscriminate in its
destructive power and was specifically designed to
concentrate its effects on the attacking troops without
leaving radioactivity on the ground. [Ref. 45 :p. 211] The
fact that the neutron bomb was not produced and deployed,
can be attributed at least in part, to one of the most
successful Soviet propaganda operations waged since World
War II. The basic theme of the propaganda was that the
neutron bomb would pose a grave threat to detente, require a
retaliatory Soviet response of building mass annihilation
weapons, and be extremely destabilizing. [Ref. 46:pp. 343-
374]
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The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has been
presented as a means of avoiding the potential for a nuclear
winter. The Department of Defense argues that the
possibility of a nuclear winter increases the need for SDI.
It is obvious that the possibility of nuclear winter
occurring would still exist with SDI unless, as President
Reagan suggested, the technology is shared, for detonations
on any continent might produce global atmospheric changes.
Additionally, concerns for damage caused by missiles, cruise
missiles, and bombers leaking through would still exist.
Uncertainties surrounding the technical and deployment
feasibilities of SDI indicate that it would be premature to
consider SDI as a solution to nuclear winter concerns. Such
considerations prompted Joseph Nye to state, "While it may
be popular politics to invoke current fads and fears to
support existing programmes, it is not good analysis, and
SDI must rest on its merits or faults, and not on
invocations of nuclear winter." [Ref. 38: p. 124]
The major argument against a reliance on new
technologies centers on its possible destabilizing nature
and the possibility that an increased arms race could ensue.
Although this argument cannot be ignored, the example of the
influence of Soviet propaganda on the neutron bomb should be
kept in mind. Western opinion has typically been over-
sensitive to the question of stability while the Soviets
have pursued their force goals relatively unencumbered by
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such concerns. Herman Kahn sums up the situation with a
definition of 'arms control' as any steps that contribute to
the objectives of diminishing the likelihood of war and to
reducing the damage of war should deterrence fail.
Sometimes a "safer" world can be achieved through arms
buildups, sometimes through arms reductions, but it cannot
be achieved by disinventing nuclear weapons. [Ref. 47: p.
193]
3 . Nuclear Proliferation
Nuclear winter findings could increase the urgency
for preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear proliferation was voiced as a concern by scientists
even before the first nuclear detonation by the U.S. in
1945. While proliferation has been slower to this point
than many anticipated, there is no guarantee that the future
will continue so. If a very low nuclear winter threshold
were accepted as valid, this could provide a strong
incentive for nations to acguire nuclear weapons, even on a
small scale, to gain political leverage by threat of nuclear
blackmail. [Ref. 39 :p. 30] Nuclear powers may take a more
aggressive approach at inhibiting proliferation.
The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) has been signed by approximately 125 nations.
In essence, the NPT asks nations without nuclear weapons to
accept a trade-off: in return for a commitment to forego
nuclear weapons, they would receive full cooperation and
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assistance in developing peaceful civilian uses of nuclear
energy from the nations that do have nuclear weapons. Under
Article Six of the NPT, nuclear weapon states are committed
to undertake arms control negotiations leading to "cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date." [Ref. 48 :p.
224] This is an area likely to become more controversial in
the future, with more pressure being exerted for serious
arms control efforts. Because nuclear winter raises a
qualitatively new threat to countries outside the direct
line of fire between the leading nuclear powers, the issue
may add to any existing concerns by other nations regarding
what many see as limited progress toward arms reductions and
disarmaments. If other countries take this as an issue,
world opinion may be generated to create greater influence
for arms negotiations. Due to the nature of our open,
democratic society, it is likely that such conditions would
place greater pressure on the United States, and may lead to
the U.S. acceptance of an inequitable agreement.
D. WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES, TARGETING AND STRATEGIES
Recognizing the possibility of the failure of deterrence
demands efforts to limit the consequences. Some strategists
are likely to consider the immediate destruction resulting
from an all-out 'spasm' war to overshadow any considerations
for the long-term effects of nuclear winter. The possibili-
ty of limited nuclear attack options should not be discount-
ed. Nuclear winter concerns may enhance the prospects of
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intra-war escalation control. In the limited nuclear war
scenario, the threat of climatic catastrophe clearly offers
additional considerations for strategies and targeting.
In addition to terrestrial limited nuclear options
which would mitigate conditions conducive to the creation of
nuclear winter effects, other war scenarios can also be
considered. War in space, occurring above the Earth's
fragile atmosphere, would not produce the dust and smoke
perturbing factors of the nuclear winter hypothesis.
Nuclear war limited to the sea would produce negligible
amounts of smoke particles and thus would also provide a
warfighting option non-conducive to nuclear winter effects.
Although these options can be considered 'safe' from the
nuclear winter aspect, they, of course, carry with them
their own detrimental consequences.
The nuclear winter hypothesis may be interpreted as
having too many uncertainties to drive major changes in
targeting doctrine at this stage. It would, at least, be
prudent to give some consideration to targeting strategies
that avoid attacks on targets in urban/ industrial areas
(areas of most concern for fire and production of greatest
amounts of smoke) . The Department of Defense officially
states that the United States does not target cities. This
response does not address the proximity of specific targets
to cities. This response does not address the proximity of
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specific targets to cities. The current version of the SIOP
(Single Integrated Operational Plan) reportedly includes
some fifty thousand potential target installations divided
into four principal groups—Soviet nuclear forces, general
purpose forces, Soviet military and political leadership
centers, and the Soviet economic and industrial base. [Ref.
49 :p. 80] The large number of potential targets indicate
the certainty that urban areas would be involved.
The Flexible Response strategy (selective targeting with
minimized collateral damage and escalation control) was
adopted by the U.S. as a more credible deterrent to the
earlier strategy of massive retaliation. Selective
targeting would obviously be less conducive to precipitating
conditions causing a nuclear winter than massive
retaliation—but would selective targeting minimize damage
(i.e., fires and creation of dust) adequately to ensure
nuclear winter would not occur?
Nuclear winter concerns intensify the doubts about
controlling nuclear war (be it on land, at sea or in space)
that have plagued even the advocates of flexible nuclear
targeting. If the environment of nuclear war is
incompatible to the "finely tuned" responses envisioned in
U.S. declaratory policy then the assured destruction school
of thought surfaces once again. [Ref. 50 :p. 94] Even a
successful strategy of limited nuclear options may involve
unavoidable collateral damage conducive to the onset of a
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nuclear winter. The TTAPS report addressed this issue with
their mix of war scenarios, one of which was a 3,000 Mt
counterforce only exchange. Of course, there are no
definite answers—but more concerns are raised surrounding
the ability to adequately minimize damage when the
possibility of creating a nuclear winter is added to the
risks of nuclear war.
Additionally, a "controlled" nuclear war would reflect
"limited" actions by all nuclear powers involved. The
Soviet view of a controlled or limited war apparently
differs from that of the U.S. If nuclear war appeared
inevitable to the Soviets, many analysts believe the Soviets
would launch a massive , preemptive counterforce strike. A
one-sided massive Soviet strike, which would have a high
probability of containing targets in or near cities, could
bring about nuclear winter conditions even if the U.S.
adhered to a strategy of selective targeting.
Arms control agreements which limit launchers and
warheads, even if complied with, would be inadequate to
remove the threat of nuclear winter. Agreements on
targeting restraints have also been suggested. Acceptance
of an agreement to avoid targeting cities would achieve
favorable propaganda value because of the sensitive moral
issue as well as a means to lessen the chance of nuclear
winter. Such an agreement would, however, be a hollow
gesture that is truly non-verifiable.
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At present, U.S. planners do not consider the smoke and
dust creating potentials of given target types or of the
nuclear winter implications of particular warheads to be
detonated at specific altitudes over those targets. There
is no data base or analysis methodology for assessing these
potentials. [Ref. 39: p. 18] However, such data would be
necessary if a nation were to evaluate their targeting
options with nuclear winter in mind.
Since the U.S. and Soviet Union are not alone in the
nuclear weapons community, other nations' targeting
strategies must also be considered. Available French
strategic writing tends to belittle counterforce concepts,
stating that anti-city attacks are the only true deterrent.
Most British and French strategic forces are believed to be
targeted on cities and command targets. Chinese nuclear
weapons are probably intended for relatively large
population centers in central and eastern Russia. [Ref.
51:p. 89]
Clearly, any nation which does accept targeting
restrictions out of concern for nuclear winter would be
decreasing their nuclear options. An emphasis would have to
be placed on designing limited nuclear attack options to
minimize climatic effects and to maximize potential for
achievement of policy goals. [Ref. 39: p. 18]
In terms of the strategy used to initiate a nuclear
conflict, some policy analysts have speculated how one side
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might use nuclear winter for strategic advantage. An
aggressor might see an advantage to limiting a nuclear
attack marginally below a threshold, gambling that the risk
of exceeding the threshold would prevent the attacked nation
from retaliating. [Ref. 28:p. 33]
This speculation assumes a common belief in the
hypothesis in general, and in a specific threshold. The
nuclear winter research, to date, indicates that a specific
threshold does not exist. Instead, the dependency of the
atmospheric and ecological response to a level of nuclear
detonations is a continuous function. A recognition of the
unknown synergistics effects within the complexities of the
environment led researchers to this conclusion. Some policy
analysts have revealed a tendency to overlook the present
scientific consensus on this point. Acceptance of the
concepts that no specific threshold exits and that a strike
on one nation will also bring adverse effects to the
attacker, mitigates a first-strike advantage as specifically
related to nuclear winter effects. Other perceived
advantages cannot be discounted however.
Some research indicates that locations close to the
source of smoke will experience adverse climatic effects
more quickly and more severely. This might be perceived as
a strategic advantage if the attacker is willing to gamble
on his own eventual risks. A nation's assessment of its own
nuclear winter risks would be founded on very uncertain
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scientific data but could consider more confirmed research
as to the vulnerabilities of agricultural systems. A
country in the more northerly latitudes, and with less
diversity of crops (i.e., the Soviet Union), would
experience more agricultural damage with a smaller change in
climate. The scientific uncertainties leave a great deal of
room for the role of perceptions to contir.ae to influence
strategies.
Nuclear winter adds to the concerns of warfighting
capabilities as to how not only to 'control' the war, but
whether or not command, control, communications and
intelligence (C3I) assets will function in a perturbed
environment. For example, optical reconnaissance satellites
may be effectively blinded as soot fills the Earth's
atmosphere. Erosion and friction effects of an upper-
altitude soot layer on outbound missiles could possibly
cause damage and/or gross inaccuracy. [Ref. 36: p. 13]
It is in this area of concern, that most nuclear winter
related R&D efforts for military applications are likely to
be directed. The military's interest in nuclear weapons'
effects has throughout its history been a demonstrated
concern for the disruption of military equipment and
operations in contrast to goals directed toward protecting
the environment. [Ref. 51: p. 34] And indeed, a very
important part of the U.S. nuclear testing program, and a
responsibility of the Defense Nuclear Agency, is to test the
78
effects of nuclear weapons on a vast array of military
equipment, with specific emphasis being given to the non-
nuclear components of U.S. strategic weapon systems, warning
sensors, and communications equipment which have to function
in a nuclear environment. [Ref. 43:pp. 10,11]
Nuclear winter concerns may influence the strategic
debate over whether or not to preempt C3I assets, but once
again ambiguities abound. C3I assets as a priority for
targeting could be interpreted as a way to cripple a foe's
retaliatory capability with minimal nuclear winter effects.
It is even suggested that obscuration effects may be
irrelevant if C3I assets were attacked early. On the other
hand, retention of C3I assets would allow a means of control
and the option of conducting war termination efforts more
easily. In either case, nuclear winter concerns could
support the already strong incentives of the U.S. and the
Soviet Union to build more enduring C3I systems. [Ref.
39:pp. 20,21]
E. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL EFFORTS
Crisis management and control efforts are seen as
safeguards to prevent nuclear war—therefore they should
take on greater importance as an incentive to prevent war
due to the additional concern of nuclear winter. If
deterrence fails—there should be a greater concern to have
efficient and survivable crisis management which could aid
in 'controlling' the war to reduce the likelihood of causing
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the onset of nuclear winter. Efforts toward reducing the
likelihood of nuclear war have included past agreements
between the U.S. and Soviet Union such as the Hotline
Agreement of 1963, the Hotline Modernization Agreement of
1971, and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement of 1973.
The present Administration has endorsed additional DOD
initiatives to improve crisis management. Although these
efforts do not specifically address nuclear winter concerns,
the objectives would be the same.
F. CIVIL DEFENSE
Debates over the deterrence impact of civil defense
measures and their stabilizing/destabilizing influence range
the gamut of perspectives. In the United States, the 1950s
popularity of the fallout shelter faded with the growth of
Soviet missile forces, realization of adequate shelter
expense, and a growing feeling among the American public
that protection measures were fruitless. The Soviets, on
the other hand, have made substantial preparations to
protect their political leadership, industrial infrastruc-
ture and general population.
Prospects of survival will obviously depend on the war
scenario. Those who believe a Soviet attack would be a
massive, surprise attack directed at population centers are
probably correct in thinking that protection of the people
in the target area would be unsuccessful. Protection
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opportunities are more feasible if a limited counterforce
attack is considered.
The possibility of a nuclear winter, in any attack
scenario, requires a reevaluation of the possible post-
attack environment. Those people who believe protection is
impossible without the additional prospects of a nuclear
winter see the added long-term effects as more convincing
evidence of the fruitlessness of passive measures.
Admittedly, all civil defense efforts have been aimed at
survival from the prompt effects of nuclear weapons. The
possibility of long-term effects should stimulate some
contingency planning for stockpiling of larger, survivable
supplies of food and increased awareness of countermeasures
to assist survivors. When concentrating on environmental
impacts that disrupt food production, consideration should
be given to distribution of surviving food surpluses and
awareness of basic survival skills. A protected means of
seed storage would not only provide the beginning of new
plant food but also a surviving variety for the possibility
of introducing more resilient strains.
G. CONCLUSIONS
All of the policy issues presented have at least two
opposing suggested solutions. The solution an analyst
chooses is based on his interpretation of deterrence and on
his view of the nature of the adversary. In this respect,
the debate over policy issues surrounding the nuclear winter
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hypothesis offers nothing new. The debate reflects the same
range of interpretations, dilemmas and ambiguities as other
salient issues of the nuclear era. This situation led Peter
Sederburg to observe, "In comparison with the policy arena,
the ambiguities of the scientific investigation resemble
certainties." [Ref. 52:p. 4]
Although it has been suggested that nuclear winter
related policies which declare restrained actions during a
war may break down under a crisis situation (since the onset
of war itself indicates a breakdown of a level of rational
thinking) —the policies are important primarily in their
day-to-day impact on foreign relations, and in their impact
on the likelihood of a crisis situation arising.
Colin Gray suggests that any strategic policy analysis
of these issues must:
- consider that extensive further study is unlikely to
resolve key scientific uncertainties.
- consider that even if key scientific uncertainties are
narrowed usefully, the phenomenon of nuclear war has to
be treated as a range of policy possibilities, not as a
single unique sequence of events.
- appreciate the implications of the fact that the
climatic consequences of nuclear war are not likely to
be within unilateral U.S. control. [Ref. 53 :p. 87]
With regard to this last point, our policy actions must
be made with an awareness of Soviet objectives and
intentions. U.S. policy considerations must be scrutinized
for their value in an interactive world—where U.S. actions
are strongly influenced by both internal and external
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forces, where our foreign policies affect world stability
and where the perceptions of U.S. strength affect the
actions of ally and adversary.
The next chapter will examine actions taken by the




This paper has presented a view of the nuclear strategic
framework within which United States and Soviet decisions
are being made concerning nuclear weapons' policies. The
scientific research surrounding the nuclear winter
hypothesis provides new information on the effects of
nuclear weapons' use which was previously unknown and
therefore unavailable to decision makers. The scientific
consensus on the plausibility of the nuclear winter
phenomena and its possible long term devastating effects are
weighting factors that can be used by decision makers in
determining the risks and consequences of a nuclear war.
The wide range of policy issues surrounding the nuclear
winter hypothesis indicate a diversity of interpretations on
how the United States could best incorporate the new
scientific information into its nuclear policies. Two major
questions considered in discussing nuclear winter policy
issues surface: what is the nature of the adversary?; and,
what deters? These questions represent a continuation of
the nuclear dilemma facing decision makers since the nuclear
era began.
Having provided this background information, the actual
responses made by the United States and the Soviet Union to
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the nuclear winter hypothesis will be presented in this
chapter.
A. THE U.S. RESPONSE
Following the TTAPS report in 1983 and early 1984, the
Reagan administration refrained from making any comment on
the nuclear winter issue. Initial responses from the
President's Office of Science and Technology Policy were
skeptical. Congress, however, indicating an acceptance of
the validity of the hypothesis and a concern for its
implications, took an early interest in the nuclear winter
issue and initiated several actions.
1. Congressional Hearings
As a consequence of the TTAPS report, an informal
hearing was conducted by Senators Edward Kennedy and Mark
Hatfield in December 1983 which was organized by the Nuclear
Freeze Foundation. 8 U.S. and Soviet scientists were
present at the forum. They discussed the policy
implications of the nuclear winter findings and generally
agreed on the seriousness of the issue.
The first formal Congressional hearings on nuclear
winter took place in July 1984. Richard Wagner, assistant
to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, told the
Joint Economic Committee that the Department of Defense was
8 It is noted that Kennedy and Hatfield have long been
advocates of the Nuclear Freeze movement and of the MAD
philosophy in general.
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taking a serious look at nuclear winter. Shortly after this
hearing, it was reported that the Reagan administration had
an interagency group working on a plan for a 5-year, $50
million research effort on nuclear winter. The agency
materialized a year later with a smaller budget.
A hearing before the Subcommittee on Natural
Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment was held in
September 1984 on the climatic, biological and strategic
effects of nuclear war. Statements were given by Carl
Sagan, Stephen Gould (Professor of Geology, Harvard
University) , Edward Teller, Alan Hecht (of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA]), and Vladimir
Aleksandrov (of the USSR Academy of Sciences)
.
It is significant to note the direct access Soviet
scientists have to Western political leaders on the nuclear
winter issue. Their potential ability to influence Western
leaders is heightened by this direct contact.
2 . Congressional Mandate for POD Response
Congress' concern over the nuclear winter issue
resulted in amendments to the Defense Authorization Act
requiring a DOD response to the issue. Senator Cohen stated
at this time, " . . . if we are to deal prudently and wisely
with this question [of nuclear winter] , we must know as
precisely as possible what the effects of these weapons
would be and how those effects should shape our policy."
[Ref. 32:p. 4]
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The resulting Section 1107 of the act ordered the
Secretary of Defense to prepare a public report on nuclear
winter and its policy implications. The report was to
cover: 1) A detailed review and assessment of scientific
findings on the consequences of nuclear war; 2) A thorough
evaluation of implications for nuclear weapons' policies; 3)
A discussion of how to incorporate such evaluations into
policy; and, 4) An analysis of how nuclear winter is being
studied. The report was to be submitted by Secretary of
Defense Weinberger by March 1, 1985. [Ref. 32: p. 4]
Secretary of Defense Weinberger's report, "The
Potential Effects of Nuclear War on the Climate," was
submitted to Congress in March 1985 and provides a clear
statement of the administration's formal position on nuclear
winter policy implications [Ref. 26:p. 27]. The 17-page
report provided a concise summary of the scientific
literature and implied acceptance of the validity of the
hypothesis. However, the report asserted that the prospect
of a nuclear winter does not alter current nuclear policies.
In fact, the report stated, the threat of nuclear winter
supported every aspect of current policy—such as existing
weapons modernization plans (with particular emphasis on the
importance of SDI) and arms control policies.
The theme of the report is summarized in this
statement, "The issues raised by the possibility of effects
of nuclear war on the atmosphere and climate only strengthen
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the basic imperative of U.S. national security policy—that
nuclear war must be prevented." And, if deterrence fails,
the current modernization program (e.g., low yield, high
accuracy weapons) , SDI efforts, and the strategy of flexible
targeting options for escalation control, would lessen the
likelihood of a nuclear winter occurring. [Ref. 54:pp.
10,12]
Congress was dissatisfied with the report. The
report received heavy criticism because it contained little
substantive discussion of even such practical issues as the
functioning of military equipment in a perturbed
environment. The report failed to follow Congress 1
directions in several respects including avoiding discussing
the biological and environmental consequences of a nuclear
war. A Freedom of Information Act request by Congress
revealed the lack of any Pentagon document in which these
consequences had ever been reviewed or their policy
implications considered. [Ref. 32: p. 5]
Following Congress' receipt of the report, two
Congressional hearings were held on nuclear winter and its
implications. Committees involved were the Committee on
Science and Technology and the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs (March 1985) and the Committee on Armed
Services (October 1985) . Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle was present at both hearings to strongly
object to any criticism of DOD's report, stating that such
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criticism missed the fundamental point of the
administration's present policy— i.e., to avoid nuclear war
[Ref. 55:pp. 151,151].
Congress mandated that the Pentagon redo the report.
DOD was again tasked to focus on nuclear winter findings and
potential policy implications.
The Pentagon's 1986 report, entitled "Technical
Issues Update," addressed the policy implications of the
nuclear winter hypothesis by stating that "... regardless
of the outcome of our technical studies , the most basic
elements of our national policy [to prevent nuclear war by
maintaining and strengthening deterrence] remain unchanged."
(emphasis added) The report went on to state that DOD has
"an appreciation" for the significance of nuclear winter
consequences as a result of targeting strategies and
technical weapons' characteristics, but that the substantial
uncertainties of the hypothesis precluded addressing such
issues of strategic policy— "Thus, the current results and
observations should not be used for planning purposes."
[Ref. 56: pp. 1,5] Congress felt that DOD had fallen short
of its required tasking once again. A 1987 DOD report on
the effects of nuclear war is underway and expected to be
available by late 1987.
The actions taken by Congress seem to indicate not
only acceptance of the hypothesis' validity but also that
Congress desires a response other than that received from
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DOD. Certainly, DOD's statement that no policy changes are
warranted is, in itself, a statement of policy. Congress




General Accounting Office (GAP) Report (1986)
The GAO responded to a request from Congress for a
review of the scientific research pertaining to nuclear
winter, to include consideration as to whether the research
findings might justify changing defense policy, in their
concise report of March 1986. The study was based on a
review of the scientific literature and also on interviews
with prominent researchers and policy analysts in the field.
As noted in Chapter III, the GAO's discussion of policy
issues was a source of primary criticism received from the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) . OSTP felt
that even a discussion of the issues was premature at this
time. Overall, the report was credited as being well
balanced and technically correct by the several administra-
tive officials, scientists and other interested parties who




As scientific interest in nuclear winter grew, the
administration gradually began to accept the issue as an
area that needed some attention. Preliminary assessments of
policy implications have been produced for DOD—one under a
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) contract to the Palomar
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Corporation entitled "Implications of the Nuclear Winter
Thesis , " and another by the Air University Center for
Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education entitled
"Nuclear Winter and National Security: Implications for
Future Policy." In order to present the issues, both
studies were predicated on the assumption that nuclear
winter is a possible outcome of nuclear conflict. Neither
study is recognized by DOD as a definitive assessment of
nuclear winter policy implications nor are they considered
by DOD as providing a basis for action at this time [Ref.
28:p. 27]
.
The primary focus of the administration's reaction
to nuclear winter has been to identify and develop a plan
for researching the physical uncertainties of the issue.
Several of the major scientific studies reviewed in Chapter
II were funded by government agencies. The National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) was requested to investigate the nuclear
winter hypothesis by DOD and received funding from DOD in
1983. The NAS report is considered one of the most
authoritative accounts on the scientific aspects of the
issue. The Department of Energy's laboratories at Los
Alamos and Livermore have been involved in nuclear winter
research since 1983-1984.
The President's Science Advisor requested in
February of 1984 that an interagency plan be developed for
studying nuclear winter. NOAA took a lead role in setting
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up the plans. As a result, the administration established
the Interagency Research Program (IRP) , in October 198 5, to
coordinate the research of the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
,
the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
of the Department of Energy (DOE) , and the National Center
for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) of the National Science
Foundation (NSF)
.
The IRP basically continues the nuclear winter
research efforts that have been ongoing since 1983 and that
were funded by DOD, DOE and NSF. Funding will continue to
come from the three agencies' budgets. Nuclear winter
research, conducted primarily at Los Alamos, Livermore and
NCAR, with some research being contracted to other
laboratories, totaled about $3.5 million for fiscal year
1985, with an increase to about $5.5 million for 1986 and
1987. The outlook is for the funding to remain about the
same over the next few years. However, some scientists
question the adequacy of the funding, the ability of the IRP
to set priority research and control funding effectively,
and the administration's long term commitment to studying
the issue. [Ref. 28:pp. 36,37]
Continued cooperation and sharing of scientific
information with the Soviet Union is encouraged by Congress.
In the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years
1986 and 1987, Congress recommended that the President
should propose, during any arms control talks held, that the
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U.S. and Soviet Union jointly study the nuclear winter
issue.
As of August 1987, a measure was under consideration
in several committees of the House of Representatives which
proposes that the U.S. and USSR enter into a joint, high-
level scientific study to determine the long term and
environmental effects of a nuclear exchange. The resolution
(which would fall under the 1985 umbrella commitments agreed
to during the Geneva summit covering scientific exploration
with the Soviets) also recommends that such effects should
also be considered in the nuclear weapons, arms control, and
civil defense policies of the United States and the Soviet
Union. [Ref. 57:pp. 1-3]
It would appear likely, from what is known (and
unknown) of Soviet policy that this recommendation offers an
excellent opportunity for Soviets to participate in and
influence U.S. decision making without making significant
contributions of information as regards their own policies
or state of available scientific data.
5. Prospect for Policy Changes
The administration took the important step of
initiating a plan for research. Beyond this step the
prognosis for further policy-related action is poor. DOD
statements provide a clear portrayal of the Administration's
position—changes in U.S. nuclear policies (arms reductions,
93
targeting strategies, weapons technology, etc.) as a
response to the nuclear winter hypothesis are not warranted.
The position of IRP's Coordinating Committee is that
the basic research must be addressed before the policy
issues should be discussed, and that any policy assessments
are at least four to five years away. [Ref. 28 :p. 26]
The GAO investigations involved contacting numerous
officials within DOD and the military services. Based on
these interviews the GAO concluded that these officials were
very much aware of the nuclear winter issue but they neither
planned nor contemplated any actions based on the
hypothesis. GAO was told by an official of the Plans and
Policy staff under the Joint Chiefs of Staff that no new
policy guidance had been issued or was planned based on the
nuclear winter issue. This same official stated that damage
associated only with the immediate blast is assessed in
considering the consequences of nuclear weapons' use. [Ref.
28:p. 26]
The administration has not translated nuclear winter
concerns into policy changes. A partial reason for a lack
of change, as indicated in OSTP comments, is due to the
existing uncertainties in the scientific research. Other
comments, particularly from DOD, indicate that increased
certainty of the scientific research would still not be
reason enough for policy changes.
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B. THE SOVIET RESPONSE
DOD's 1986 "Technical Issues Update" was submitted to
the Committee on Armed Services with a cover letter. Soviet
perceptions of deterrence and of the nuclear winter
hypothesis were key themes in the letter:
Whether the Soviets will, in fact, be prevented from
starting a nuclear war, depends ultimately on their views
of what constitutes sufficient deterrence—not on our
views. The case at issue, i.e. whether possible climatic
effects make a difference, depends critically on the
USSR's estimate of the implications of the posited
phenomena.
We cannot count on the Soviets being "self-deterred"
by the prospects of climatic effects, because no one knows
today to what extent the phenomena will occur and because
we will probably never be confident of knowing the Soviets
real views as they relate to deterrence. The observation
would be true even if the scientific uncertainties were to
be significantly narrowed . (emphasis added) [Ref. 58 :p.
2]
As discussed in previous chapters, an appreciation for
Soviet thinking has at times been lacking in U.S. policy
planning. Any response to the nuclear winter hypothesis, in
order to be effective and maintain U.S. national security
objectives, must consider Soviet perceptions. This section
will examine the Soviet Union's observed responses and the
Western interpretations of the Soviet behavior.
1. Soviet Research
During the 1970s, the Soviets were involved in
studies of Martian dust storms, as were U.S. scientists.
Following the AMBIO article in 1982, nuclear winter research
proceeded simultaneously in the U.S. and the USSR
—
prior to
the focus of public attention aroused by the TTAPS report.
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Soviet research took place at the Computer Center of the
Academy of Sciences and at the Institute of Physics of the
Atmosphere of the Academy of Sciences. Joint papers by U.S.
and Soviet scientists have ben published since 1984. [Ref.
59 :p. 198] Examples of joint research include the active
cooperation between scientists at the USSR National Academy
of Sciences and the U.S. government's own nuclear weapons'
research facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
and participation by Soviet scientists in producing the
SCOPE report.
Soviet scientists were the first to apply a three-
dimensional model to the nuclear winter research. The
Soviet climate model consisted of 'borrowed' U.S. models—
a
two-level global circulation atmospheric model and a
thermodynamic model of the upper ocean. [Ref. 60 :p. 29]
Significantly, however, the three-dimensional model of V.
Aleksandrov and G. Stenchikov did not produce the
ameliorating effects later achieved in U.S. three-
dimensional models which incorporate the moderating effects
of the ocean. The research, published only in English, was
initially proclaimed as an independent effort which
supported the TTAPS results. Closer examination of the
research by U.S. scientists, including Carl Sagan, resulted
in comments to the effect that the study actually
contributed very little to the research efforts and that it
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was a seriously flawed and weak piece of work. [Ref. 60:pp.
29,30]
According to many U.S. scientists, Soviet involve-
ment in nuclear winter research continues to contribute
little to reducing theory uncertainties; primarily due to
weaknesses in modeling capability. Computer technology has
been an acknowledged area of U.S. superiority. Therefore, a
scientific pursuit which relies on computer modeling would
likely be of higher quality in the U.S. Priority assigned
to the research (and hence availability of computer
resources, funding and personnel) would also affect the
quality of the research.
Regardless of the Soviets' level of sincere interest
in nuclear winter, they are definitely interested in gaining
computer knowledge. One objective does not necessarily
exclude the other. The Soviets have requested the use of
advanced U.S. computers to conduct nuclear winter research.
The Soviets' request was denied. [Ref. 61:pp. 20,21] This
denial was probably based on the fact that technology
transfer would be a highly prized benefit to the Soviet
Union of joint nuclear winter research. Such technology has
direct application to improved weapons' technology and other
military applications.
Some U.S. scientists have questioned the originality
of Soviet research. Soviet studies have used Western data
for war scenarios, megatonnage, and the physical parameters
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of particulate matter. Soviet scientists have been
unwilling or unable to make fire and smoke research data
available. Specific information was requested by Carl Sagan
at a 1983 conference to include data on particulate matter
from Soviet nuclear weapon tests prior to the 1963 Limited
Test Ban Treaty and information on particle size and
absorption coefficients from large Siberian fires. Sagan
also requested information on Soviet war scenarios. The
request was not fulfilled. [Ref. 60:pp. 31,32]
Contributions from Soviet scientists at internation-
al conferences have also been labeled as mediocre and non-
contributory to advancement of the hypothesis. Regardless
of the Soviets' level of scientific interest in nuclear
winter, such mediocre contributions follow the pattern of
Soviet scientific "exchanges." The exchange is frequently
sought from West to East with little information of value
offered from the Soviet side.
2 . Soviet Internal Coverage
Soviet internal media coverage has increased
gradually with time. The 'telebridge' dialogue between
American and Soviet scientists at the "Conference on the
World After Nuclear War," held in Washington in late 1983,
was given fragmentary coverage in the Soviet Union. The
brief coverage was representative of published articles as
well. However, since mid-1984, press coverage has become
more extensive. It remains true, however, that many Soviet
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publications on nuclear winter are produced primarily for a
foreign audience: this includes the only Soviet book so far
published on the subject, which comes in the international
series of Mir [Peace] publishers (entitled The Night
After . . . ) . [Ref. 59:pp. 202,203]
3 . Soviet Reports for Export
Reference to nuclear winter effects by Soviets, in
whatever format, have consistently portrayed the worst case
situation of severe temperature drops with frequent
references to verification of data by 'mathematical
precision. ' Soviet reports indicate the belief that even a
very limited attack would likely trigger climatic
devastation. The Soviets have linked the nuclear winter
hypothesis to their "no-first-use" declaration and their
public stance on arms control, specifically with reference
to SDI. Whether the audience is Soviet or foreign the
message consistently portrays the horror of nuclear war with
nuclear winter predictions accepted as valid. [Ref. 61: pp.
21,22]
The Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
provides several examples of Soviet worst-case reports. In
January 1986, FBIS cited an English TASS dispatch carrying
statements from a Soviet specialist in environmental
physics, Kirill Kondratyev. He claimed, "... man can
exist only in a definite temperature regime. Changes from
warmth to cold will be so sharp [as a consequence of nuclear
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winter] that a global ecological catastrophe will happen.
Everything on earth will perish. ..." [Ref. 62 :p. ul]
Kondratyev goes on to make the link to an anti-SDI
stance, "All this makes it possible to imagine how dangerous
military actions in space are. The so-called 'Strategic
Defense Initiative' means a possibility of nuclear
explosions at earth satellite's altitudes, and hence an
ecological catastrophe." [Ref. 62: p. ul]
The Soviets have also applied such extensions of the
nuclear winter idea to conventional warfare. Nikita
Moiseyev, Deputy Director of the Computing Center of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, cited by TASS stated,
The mathematical models [of nuclear war] showed the earth
enveloped in soot, impenetrable to sun rays, but only as a
result of the use of nuclear weapons. An effect, similar
to the 'nuclear winter' one, might also emerge as a result
of the use of conventional weapons whose capacity is
constantly increasing. . . . [Ref. 63 :p. AA3
]
The Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace has
devoted considerable efforts to analyzing and publicizing
the catastrophic impact of nuclear winter on the Third
World. A working group has been set up for this purpose,
headed by the Director of the Institute of African Studies.
A Western commentator has remarked that this may be an
effort to counter an irresponsible attitude to the dangers
of nuclear war on the part of some Third World nations.
[Ref. 59:p. 204]
Alternatively, such emphasis may reflect the overall
importance the Soviets place on the role of the Third World
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in the socialist/imperialist struggle. Comments indicative
of this interpretation can be found in the committee's
writings, for example,
. . . states which lease their territories [and]
surrounding seas for American bases and other military
facilities, and allow U.S. warships to enter their ports
and patrol on their waters . . . may at any moment become
involved in a nuclear conflict contrary to their national
interest. [Ref. 64:p. 205]
Publicly, Soviet scientific spokesmen have whole-
heartedly embraced the nuclear winter hypothesis. The
highest level of Soviet scientific community and of the USSR
Academy of Sciences publicly claim to believe in the likely
occurrence of a severe nuclear winter in the event of a
nuclear war. No divergent views within the Soviet
scientific community have been revealed. [Ref. 60:p. 34]
This presents a much different situation than in the Western
scientific community where debates as to the uncertainties
and ameliorating effects are ongoing.
4 . Propaganda Value
The foregoing information has led many analysts to
conclude that the Soviets use the nuclear winter issue
mainly for propaganda purposes via the media and
international forums [Ref. 28 :p. 13]. DOD states this same
position in their 1985 report to the Congress.
As mentioned in Chapter I, since the 1970s, the
Soviets have altered their public statements about the
"winnability" of nuclear war, probably as a result of their
awareness of Western perceptions. Some commentators accept
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the public statements at face value. Soviet reports which
stress worst-case nuclear winter scenarios and the
extinction of mankind are quite similar to the post-1970
public statements stressing the horrors of nuclear war even
before an appreciation of long term climatic effects had
surfaced. Accepted at face value, such statements would
indicate a convergence toward the assured destructionist
ideas prevalent in American public thought. Acceptance of
the statements may also lead one to believe that Soviet
military policy is based on MAD principles.
Such public statements are, however, at variance
with the continuity in nuclear doctrine evident in Soviet
research, development and deployment of strategic systems,
and in the pattern of Soviet military exercises. Analysis
of this evidence indicates a continuity of the Soviet war-
fighting doctrine with strategic superiority as a goal.
[Ref. 65:p. 33]
When Soviet offensive and defensive military
programs are contrasted with public statements since the
early 1970s, certain conclusions concerning Soviet
objectives appear evident. These are: to deprive American
exponents of mutual assured destruction substantial evidence
of the Soviet's warfighting/damage limitation strategy and
conversely, to provide support and some evidence for
proponents of MAD that the Soviet military attitudes have
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shifted to an appreciation for mutual vulnerability. [Ref.
66:p. 386]
The change in publicly expressed military doctrine
on the consequences of nuclear weapons' use started with the
'peace' program initiated at the Soviet Party Congress in
1971. [Ref. 65:p. 32] The Soviet Union has a history of
using propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy,
particularly in its exploitation of 'peace' to combat the
West. The Western quest for peace has provided the single
most frequent theme to serve as a rallying point for
propaganda attacks on the West.
From past experience (e.g., the neutron bomb issue)
the West should expect the USSR to exploit any and all
available situations to stir up controversy over nuclear
issues among NATO allies and the international scene in
general. The principal goals of Soviet overt propaganda and
covert political techniques have remained consistent: to
weaken the United States and NATO and to bolster the Soviet
Union, thereby creating a favorable environment for the
advancement of Soviet objectives. [Ref. 67: p. 39]
The threat of a nuclear winter heightens concern
over nuclear weapons. By publicly stating their belief in
the horrors of nuclear war and their desire for peace, the
Soviets are creating a diversion from scrutiny of their own
objectives and defense doctrines. The policies of Western
democracies, on the other hand, are open to domestic and
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international scrutiny and the resultant pressures of that
scrutiny. Such pressures could lead to an environment
favorable to advancement of Soviet objectives—such as a
weakening of the NATO alliance due to nuclear controversies,
or arms control agreements which hamper the West and benefit
the Soviets.
While Soviet exploitation of the nuclear winter
issue for propaganda purposes should come as no surprise to
the West, there are many questions which still remain as to
Soviet perceptions of the nuclear winter hypothesis.
Exploitation of the issue for propaganda purposes does not
preclude the possibility that the Soviet scientific
community may, in fact, hold the same consensus of
plausibility for the hypothesis as is held in the Western
world. The significant point, however, is to recognize that
the Soviet scientific establishment is a part of the Soviet
state and Communist Party organization. Gorbachev, speaking
of the need for a devoted Party attitude to assess current
events and phenomena, stated in a 1984 speech, "It is
necessary to actively draw our scientists and specialists
and professional people into information and propaganda
work. . . ." [Ref. 68:pp. 416,417]
Participation by scientists in international forums,
publications of scientific research, etc. , are all strictly
regulated in the Soviet Union. The West is reading and
hearing only information which the Soviet leadership wants
104
to be made available. Conscious choices of censorship or
embellishments have been made by the Soviet leadership and
can be considered to reflect to some degree their political
objectives
.
5 . Impact on Nuclear Strategy
What is the impact of the nuclear winter hypothesis
on the Soviet leadership decision making? It is worth
noting that a very high percentage of Party elite have
technical backgrounds and would be well suited to appreciate
the scientific findings and the technical implications for
military applications. As the GAO report concluded, there
is no information to permit a firm assessment of how the
Soviet Union leadership actually perceives the nuclear
winter implications. [Ref. 28 :p. 13]
To date, there is no indication that the implica-
tions of a possible nuclear winter effect have in any way
influenced Soviet strategic doctrine or programs for the
further buildup of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The
amount of interest given nuclear winter by Soviet scientists
indicates that it is a significant issue in the Soviet
Union. The significance of the propaganda value has been
presented as being fully in line with continuing Soviet
"peace" objectives.
The conclusion that the Soviets use the hypothesis
primarily for its propaganda aspect is supported by: 1) The
lack of originality in Soviet research; 2) The lack of
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additional insights and contributions to furthering the
research; 3) The consistent and unanimous portrayal by
Soviet scientists and politicians of worst-case scenarios;
4) The applied linkage of the hypothesis to other themes
which benefit the Soviet Union—no-first-use, anti-U.S. SDI
endeavors; and, 5) The publication of nuclear winter
literature primarily for a foreign audience (i.e.,
publications which only appear in English) . Whether or not
the nuclear winter hypothesis holds additional significance
to the Party leadership and to Soviet military policies,
will remain an issue of speculation.
It is, however, likely that a nation possessing a
warfighting strategy would at least question the effects of
the perturbed nuclear winter environment on the ability of
its weapons to perform. Soviet analysts would question such
new factors as to their impact on deterrence. The questions
asked by Western analysts concerning the impact of the
nuclear winter hypothesis on deterrence may be different
than those asked by Soviets—because deterrence means
something different to Soviets—as does stability and
superiority.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A common theme of policy analysts, scientists and
political leaders is that a credible nuclear policy must
take into consideration the consequences of deterrence
failing. A full recognition of such consequences should
include a knowledge of both short-term and long-term nuclear
weapons' effects as well as an appreciation for the vast
uncertainties surrounding the war scenarios of man and the
interrelationships of the earth's physical and biological
processes. Scientific research provides decision makers
with such knowledge to serve as a basis for assessing the
consequences of nuclear war.
Nuclear weapons were used in 1945 without a reasonable
knowledge of even the short-term effects. However, even
without this knowledge, nuclear weapons were rapidly
incorporated into every facet of the United States' policies
for national security. Nuclear weapons now play a central
role in the strategy of maintaining the national security of
the nuclear powers and in maintaining the overall stability
of the international world as influenced by the interests of
the nuclear powers. The nuclear strategies of the Soviet
Union and of the United States have been shaped by different
forces and objectives. The end result, their reliance on
nuclear weapons, is a common factor.
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This thesis has explored the variety of reactions made
in response to the new scientific information concerning the
long-term consequences of a nuclear war. Herman Kahn in
Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (written prior
to the first nuclear winter studies) , classifies the belief
that "Nuclear war would result in the destruction of the
created order" as one of 12 "almost nonissues." A nonissue
is defined as a widely held, emotionally defended
proposition that offers little guidance on how to make the
world safer from the threat of nuclear war. [Ref. 47 :p. 30]
The nuclear winter hypothesis has attracted increased
attention in the scientific community over the past five
years. The research has advanced to the state that, in
spite of remaining uncertainties, there is a consensus of
plausibility for the hypothesis and for the impact such an
effect would have on the earth's environment. The validity
of this "nonissue" has increased to the point that the
emotional aspects of the horrors of a nuclear war are now
given additional credence by scientific research. The
dilemma of the issue is that the "guidance" offered by
scientific information has many interpretations on how best
to keep the world safe from nuclear war.
A. U.S. FUTURE RESPONSE
In concurrence with the scientific consensus, Western
political leaders and policy analysts also exhibit a
consensus of acceptance as to the validity of the nuclear
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winter hypothesis. In spite of a common acceptance,
responses to the nuclear winter hypothesis exhibit wide
divergence. An analyst's interpretation of the concept of
deterrence and view of the nature of the adversary are key
factors in determining a response. There are two broad
categories of response in the United States: 1) Those who
believe no change in U.S. nuclear policy (weapons
technology, arsenal strength, targeting, etc.) is warranted;
and, 2) Those who believe the scientific information
requires a change in nuclear policy.
The latter group can generally be characterized as
proponents of the MAD philosophy. Arms reductions are vital
to this approach since fewer weapons are equated to a
decreased likelihood of war occurring. There are no winners
in a nuclear war and there is no defense from its devasta-
tion. Nuclear winter underlines these concerns.
The actions of Congress—mandating a response from DOD
on nuclear winter and policy, dissatisfaction with DOD's
response, continued measures which emphasize joint research
and arms control—suggest that Congress belongs to the
second group. Their actions indicate a belief that
important policy changes should be derived from the nuclear
winter hypothesis. The conflict between DOD's position and
the position that Congress is apparently advocating leads to
the following inferences:
- DOD states that the present policy provides the best
deterrent. If deterrence fails, the present warfighting
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strategy of limited nuclear options and escalation
control, combined with improved technology, provides the
best hope for lessening the chances of a nuclear winter
occurring. Since Congress does not agree with this
position, it is inferred that Congress is seeking an
abandonment of the warfighting emphasis.
- The desire for an abandonment of the warfighting
emphasis implies a re-emphasis of the MAD strategy and
philosophy.
- A re-emphasis of the MAD philosophy incorporates an
emphasis on arms control and the need for drastic arms
reductions.
Those who believe that the nuclear winter hypothesis
does not warrant a change in policy characteristically
emphasize the necessity of maintaining a credible deterrence
as perceived by the Soviet Union. There is an appreciation
within this group's thinking for Soviet military strategy—
a
strategy which emphasizes the value of superiority in
quantitative and qualitative military forces, designed to
fight and win a war. Not only does military superiority
provide the best deterrent in the Soviet view, it also
influences daily international politics in favor of the
Soviet Union, especially when combined with "peace" movement
propaganda diversions. Mutual vulnerability is not a part
of Soviet doctrine.
The Administration advocates the 'no change' approach as
evidenced in the 1985 and 1986 DOD reports required by
Congress. U.S. declaratory policy shifted away from the MAD
philosophy with NSDM-242 of 1974. The Reagan Administra-
tion's Force Modernization Program is a continuation of this
approach. The current Program stresses the revitalization
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of strategic offensive and defensive forces in an effort to
more realistically match capabilities with the declaratory
policy and with the operational policy which has been
consistent since the 1960s in its counterforce objectives.
In the Administration's view, our present strategy is the
best way to deter the Soviets and avoid nuclear war—with or
without nuclear winter.
The tension between Congress and the Administration
surrounding the nuclear winter issue typifies the conflict
between the two major schools of thought—assured
destruction vs. warfighting—which has characterized the
nuclear policy of the United States for the past 40 years.
The result of the conflict, while not actually changing
operational policy, has influenced the allocation of defense
resources. Inconsistent allocation of resources has
contributed to a mismatch between capability and declaratory
policy.
It is concluded by this author that the DOD reports, in
general, offer the most appropriate response to the nuclear
winter issue. United States' policy making must be done
with an appreciation for Soviet objectives and intentions.
The climatic consequences of nuclear war are not likely to
be within unilateral U.S. control. Decisions must be made
based on their value in an interactive world.
Public claims made by Soviet leaders and scientists
state that severe nuclear winter conditions would result
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from a small limited use of nuclear weapons, use of weapons
in space, and even conventional weapons. The U.S.
Department of Defense, while acknowledging the severe
consequences of possible nuclear winter effects, has
combined its force modernization with a strategy and
technology that offer mitigating options to nuclear winter
effects should deterrence fail.
It is recognized that nuclear winter concerns may be
irrelevant to the inadvertent model of war initiation
dominated by non-rational factors. However the response to
nuclear winter during time of peace can affect the day to
day outcome of relations and likelihood of crisis situations
occurring.
The tension between Congress and DOD, the potential
impact of an aroused MAD oriented public, and the potential
for foreign influence on U.S. policy, all offer avenues
which can affect the United States' military posture and
national security—in spite of an unchanged operational
policy. Enhanced fears of nuclear war promote the influence
of self-deterrence. The Soviet use of nuclear winter for
its propaganda value stimulates and enhances these potential
forces which can create an advantageous environment for the
pursuit of Soviet objectives.
B. SOVIET FUTURE RESPONSE
The observed Soviet response to the nuclear winter issue
is consistent with their public stance on the horrors of
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nuclear war as espoused since the early 1970s. The public
view is, however, inconsistent with the steady buildup of
offensive and defensive forces. Pursuit of the benefits
achieved by propagandizing the nuclear winter issue does not
preclude an acceptance of the scientific aspects of the
hypothesis at a level comparable to that in the West.
It is the conclusion of this author that asymmetric
acceptance of the nuclear winter hypothesis is not the
critical issue. The critical issue is how the acceptance
affects nuclear strategy, which will be shaped by the
'asymmetric' doctrines of the United States and the Soviet
Union.
While the United States has adopted the goals of nuclear
stability and parity, the Soviet Union has aimed for
military superiority. The capability to wage a nuclear war
in terms of military preparation is a major element of a
visible Soviet deterrent. Superiority in quality, quantity
and preparation provides the best deterrent. Unlike the
U.S., the Soviet Union has exhibited consistency in its
stable, long-term view of its own security problems and
resultant sustained drive to acquire balanced offensive and
defensive forces.
It is the author's view that acceptance of the nuclear
winter hypothesis would not alter the established soviet
doctrine. The hypothesis may, in fact, add support to the
strategies of this doctrine.
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Recognition of the potential for climatic changes, when
combined with the greater vulnerability of the Soviet Union
to decreases in temperature and less crop tolerance due to
the geography, would make nuclear winter effects of concern
for the survivability of the Soviet Union. Expected
responses, put in the framework of existing Soviet doctrine,
would be to continue to strengthen the Soviet position of
military superiority in order to ensure that deterrence
continues. In the event that deterrence fails (due to
aggression by the West) , the defensive measures in effect,
and improvements being pursued, would serve to ameliorate
nuclear winter conditions. Their long-standing civil
defense and grain storage efforts for surviving a nuclear
war are much more likely to meet the challenges of a nuclear
winter environment than the insubstantial plans of the U.S.
Additionally, a warfighting strategy requires survivable
C3I capabilities and reliable weapon systems. Regardless of
its long-term climatic effects, the nuclear winter issue has
identified the problem of enormous amounts of particulate
matter elevated into the atmosphere during a war. In order
to maintain superior warfighting capabilities, Soviet
technology would have to address the functioning of systems
in a perturbed environment.
The DOD reports failed to address similar concerns in
the United States, perhaps in an effort to avoid further
confrontation between the warfighting and MAD proponents.
114
It would be expected that information gained from scientific
research would be applied to a survivable weapons
technology, especially in light of the emphasis placed on a
survivable C3I as part of the Administration's declaratory
policy.
C. THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WINTER RESEARCH
The complexity of the nuclear winter hypothesis and its
biological implications offers an area of scientific
research which can never be definitively explained and
quantified. As such, the hypothesis offers inexhaustible
opportunities for research.
The Soviet Union is in a position to benefit from
continued joint research in several respects: 1) for the
scientific pursuit of increased knowledge in order to meet
the challenge of preparation for survival in an altered
environment and for the C3I and weapons modification needed
to function in a perturbed environment during a war; 2) for
the benefit of favorable gains in world opinion as a
concerned nation contributing to peaceful endeavors; 3) for
the benefit of technology transfer; and, 4) as a method to
gain access to and influence the decision making process in
the United States.
Both groups in the United States—those advocating
change, as well as those advocating no change—agree on the
need for additional research for the scientific pursuit of
increased knowledge. An additional motive for more research
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of MAD proponents would be continued public and scientific
attention on the consequences of nuclear war which they
interpret as supporting their position.
A motive of those advocating no change in nuclear policy
would be to provide evidence that they are truly concerned
about such consequences—even though the research will not
result in policy changes
—
possibly lessening criticism from
their opponents. Due to the possibility of endless
research, the statement that the present state of
uncertainty surrounding the nuclear winter hypothesis does
not warrant policy changes at this time, becomes equivalent
to the statement that nuclear policies will remain unchanged
regardless of the outcome of the technical studies.
D. POLICIES REMAIN UNCHANGED
Many policy analysts believe that the degree of
acceptance of the validity of the nuclear winter hypothesis
by the United States and the Soviet Union will be reflected
in the degree to which their strategic postures and policies
are modified by the hypothesis. The evidence of observed
responses to date, in combination with an appreciation for
factors influencing the past development of both nations'
nuclear policies, do not support this belief. It is the
conclusion of this author that the degree of acceptance will
not directly be reflected in any policy changes.
However, due to the nature of democracies, the United
States decision makers may feel increased external as well
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as domestic pressures to pursue actions which may actually
decrease the security of the United States—such as
inequitable arms control agreements. This situation is
enhanced by the nuclear winter hypothesis and will be
pursued by the Soviets to suit their objectives. Having
presented the conclusion that policy will not change as a
result of the nuclear winter hypothesis, the U.S. must still
be concerned with its ability to implement its policy. The
U.S. must confront public opinion and confront the pervasive
nature of Soviet propaganda.
Nuclear winter effects, unsuspected for 40 years,
highlight how little is known of the consequences of nuclear
war. The information that is available, combined with the
uncertainties, has not altered the nuclear decision making
process. The nuclear policies which developed without
scientific knowledge of the consequences of nuclear weapons
use—except in direct military applications—appear
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